Empirical Examination of a Closed Information System: A Study in the Sociology of Knowledge by Woodman, William Franklin
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF A CLOSED INFORMATION 
SYSTEM: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
By 
WILLIAM FRANKLIN WOODMAN· 
/( 
Bachelor of Science 
West Texas State University 
Canyon, Texas 
1968 
Master of Arts 
West Texas State University 
Canyon; Texas 
1970 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Oegree of 
OOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
May, 1973 
AN E~IRICAL EXAMINATION OF A CLOSED !~FORMATION 
SYSTEM: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Thesis Approved: 
~,.,. 'i,rs .. •!,. 
. asi s Adviser . 
'~~' 
t' 
on~~ ... 
Dean of the Graduate College 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
OKLAHOMA 
STATE UNIVERSITY 
i- LIBRARY 
' 
FEB 18 Hl74 
The author wishes here to express his sincere appreciation to his 
adviser, Dr. Ivan Chapman, for his ideas, encouragement, and support 
throughout the preparation of this dissertation. In addition, a most 
genuine thanks is extended to Dr. Richard Dodder, Dr. F. Gene Acuff, and 
Dr. Daniel Selakovich who gave so generously of their time and sugges-
tions. Without the assistance of the respective Assistant Deans of Stu-
dent Affairs, Mr. Tom Keys and Ms. Karen Irey, the project might have 
been impossible. 
To the Department of Sociology of Oklahoma State University is ex-
tended the author's gratitude, for use of the Department's expertise and 
facilities throughout the research. To the various fraternities and so-
rorities who participated anonymously, goes an additional thanks. 
A special debt of gratitude is reserved for Toni Gael Crockett 
Woodman for her expert, yet inexpensive services as research assistant, 
editor, proofreader, and typist. May her tribe increase. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The Problem • 
THEORETICAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN EMPIRICAL SOCIOLOGY 
OF KNOWLEDGE. 
The Development of The Sociology of Knowledge. 
The Marxians. 
The Phenomenologists. 
The Empiricists. 
Critics of the Sociology of Knowledge. 
Today's Sociology of Knowledge. 
Research Position. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE. 
Knowledge and Ideological Systems. 
Propaganda and Diffusion. 
Public and Political Opinion. 
Mass Media Format and Effects. 
Social and National Development • 
RESEARCH DESIGN. 
The Methodological Dilemma. 
The Problem • 
Ecological Setting. 
The Sample. 
The Data. 
The Instrument. 
Operational Procedures. 
Statistical Analysis. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA. 
The Scope and Functioning of the Knowledge System. 
The University. 
The Knowledge Network • 
Functions of the System. 
Content and Access to the Knowledge System. 
iv 
Page 
1 
4 
6 
6 
6 
12 
20 
• 31 
• 34 
• 37 
• 40 
• 40 
• 43 
• 46 
• 48 
• 50 
53 
53 
55 
55 
57 
57 
60 
• 61 
62 
65 
65 
66 
68 
• 70 
• 72 
Chapter 
VI. 
Effects of the Knowledge System. 
Opinion Survey. 
Primary Effects. 
The Bales and Couch Scale. 
Scott Value Scale. 
Summary of Primary Effects. 
Secondary Effects. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
Summary of the Findings. 
Statistical Significance. 
Substantitive Significance 
Conclusions. 
Suggestions for Further Research. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
APPENDICES • 
APPENDIX A. 
APPENDIX B. 
APPENDIX c. 
APPENDIX D. 
APPENDIX E. 
) 
v 
Page 
77 
78 
86 
86 
88 
90 
90 
97 
97 
97 
99 
101 
103 
104 
119 
120 
128 
129 
130 
132 
LI ST OF TABLES 
Table 
I. Response to the Question: "Was the Presence of a Test 
File Given as a Reason That You Should Join Your 
Page 
Fraternity or Sorority?" • • • • • • • • • • • • 79 
II. Response to the Question: "How Often Do You Use the 
Test Files?" •••••• 
III. Response to the Question: "Have You Ever Felt That 
There Was Anything Wrong (Or Inunoral) About 
Using the Test Files?" • • • • • • • • . • • • 
Response to the Question: Do You Feel That All In-
structors Should Be Required to Place Old Tests 
on File in the Library so That Anyone Could See 
Them by Simply Checking Them Out?" • • ••• 
V. Response to the Question, "Do the Test Files Help?" •• 
VI. Response to the Question, "How Reliable is the Infor-
mation in the Files?" ••••••••• 
VI!. Response to the Question: "When Another Fraternity 
or Sorority Member Asks if an Elective Course is a 
Good One, Does He Mean an Easy One or an Effective 
Course?" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..•.. 
VIII. Bales and Couch Value-Profile Controlling for G.P~A., 
Group Membership, and Knowledge-System Usage. 
IX. Bales and Couch Value-Profile Controlling A.C.To Scores, 
Group Membership, and Knowledge-System Usage ••••• 
X. Scott Value Scale Controlling for GoP.A., Group Member-
ship, and Knowledge-System Usage ••••••••••• 
XI. Scott Value Scale Controlling for A. C. T., Group Member-
ship, and Knowledge-System Usage ••••••••••• 
vi 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Table 
XII. 
XIII. 
XIV'o 
Means for Bales and Couch Value Profile Scale by Group 
Membership Converted to Standard Base ( 100) • • ·• • 
Means for Scott Value Scale by Group Membership Con-
verted to Standard Base (100) ••• 
. . . . 
. . . . 
Relative Rankings of Value-Factors in Scott Value 
Scale by Strength of Response ••• . . . . . . 
vii 
Page 
91 
93 
94 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There exists today a great deal of discussion and very little under-
standing of knowledge production and its consumption. The Americen ef-
fort in the direction of mass education is broadly motivated by the 
underlying premise that the public requires and benefits from formal ed-
ucation. Yet while formal education is little more than the transmission 
of standardized knowledge, little is known about knowledge as a trans-
mitted commodity or of the presumed efforts of the widespread distribu-
tion of the various kinds of knowledge. 
Using this simple proposition as a springboard, great avenues of 
research are opened to the curious. Meaningful questions beg answers, 
including: "What is and what is not knowledge?," "What is the individual 
effect of knowledge?," and "What are the collective social effects of 
knowledge?" Obviously such sweeping questions cannot be answered in a 
limited research context. The last query, however, carries monumental 
implications, and it is this question that will be herein pursued. 
Before proceeding further, some definitional guidelines should be 
established. As can be seen later, the specification of the term 11know-
ledge" is somewhat encumbered through the earlier uses by its applica-
tion to virtually everything non-materially social from ideas to ideolo-
gies. It is surprising that writers of the stature of Kurt Wolff, 
Robert K. Merton, and Irving Zeitlin use the term freely without 
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definition. Curtis and Petras (1970:1) recognized the nature of the 
problem when they wrote: 
In a sense, the sociology of knowledge in the field of soi-
ology is analogous to the concept of attitude in social 
psychology. Although each concept occupies a central po-
sition in its respective field, both suffer from the lack 
of precise definition. 
As a result, the range of definitions may leave the uniniated wondering 
where the true field lies. A sampling may be seen in the following. 
Berger and Luckmann (1966:13) define the subject too broadly for a nar-
2 
row research approach, specifying that, 11The sociology of knowledge must 
concern itself with everything that passes for 'knowledge' in a society. 11 
Broader yet is Mannheim's (1952:109) definition which maintains that the 
sociology of knowledge, " ••• seeks to analyze the relationship be-
tween the knowledge and existence." Better for research is Coser and 
Rosemberg's definition (1964:667), the sociology of knowledge is that 
branch of sociology which II studies relationships between thoughts and 
society," and Merton's (1957:456), the sociology of knowledge is 11 
[a] concern with relations between knowledge and other existential fac-
tors in society." Adler (1957: 396) even found it necessary to locate 
the sociology of knowledge in the field of science, saying: 
The sociology of knowledge. is a branch of science. It 
deals with the socio-cultural factors associated with thought 
artd its various forms of expression. The sociology of know-
ledge consequently overlaps with the sociologies of religion, 
of art, of literature, of law, of politics, • of relations 
between knowledge and religion, ••• [and] the relation of 
linguistic behavior to cognitive behavior. 
Adler's definition is a general definition of the sociology of knowledge 
sufficient to provide a conceptual umbrella for the plethora of interests 
and concerns of the sociology of knowledge 
A precise and non-ideological definition of knowledge, although 
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differentiated, is found in Webster's Third New International Dictionar_y 
(1961:1252-1253). It reads: 
Knowledge applies to any body of known facts or to any body of 
ideas inferred from such facts or ac~epted as truths on good 
grounds • , • 
Science still sometimes interchanges with knowledge but connnon-
ly applies to a body of systemitized knowledge comprising facts 
carefully gathered and general truths carefully inferred from 
them, often underlying a practice, usually connoting exactness, 
and often denoting knowledge of unquestioned certainty , •• 
Learning applies to knowledge gained by study, often long and 
careful and sometimes connoting comprehensiveness and pro-
fundity •• , 
Information generally applies to knowledge, connnonly accepted 
as true, of a factual kind usually gathered from others or 
from books • • • 
A sociological definition by Bottomore (1956:56) restricts the meaning 
of knowledge sufficiently so that it could serve as a focus of research: 
Knowledge ••• includes true and false beliefs, as well as 
beliefs which are neither true nor false; these distinctions 
are for philosophers, not sociologists to make. 
For purposes of this research, however, the two definitions allowing 
maximum flexibility are taken from Boskoff and Bottomore. Boskoff 
(1969: 08) writes: 
••• we might best describe this area in terms of two compo-
nents--(1) a core of basic questions, problems, and objectives 
(the major orientation of the sociology of knowledge); and (2) 
a quite fluid periphery of specific theoretical problems, 
techniques, and marginal studies that may be interpreted as 
clarifications and extensions of the core. • they tend to 
correspond, respectively, to the 'European' and 'American' 
versions of the sociology of knowledge. 
Bottomore (1956:56) yields an operational definion of the sociology of 
knowledge in very Marxian terms~ 
The sociology of knowledge, then, is the study of the rela-
tions between the constructs of reflective thought and social 
structure, that is, between such constructs and social groups 
(occupations, connnunities, etc. as well as social classes), 
institutions and total societies. 
Finally, numerous terms will be defined as they appear contextually. 
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The Problem 
The general focus of the sociology of knowledge nas traditionally 
revolved about a pivotal assumption--knowledge as a product is group 
conditioned. Consequently, the question the researchers have attempted 
to answer has been, "Can the presence of a known body of knowledge be 
demonstrated to have measurable effects on a group, assuming all other 
factors to be equal?" This, essentially, is the problem to be researched 
here. It will be demonstrated later that an attempt to concentrate on 
the effects of knowledge on groups run counter to most research. The 
trend, to date, has been to center upon group effects on shared knowledge 
(usually only ideological in context). 
The problem to be discussed may be stated in the following terms~ 
New members of a limited and known population will be studied to measure 
hypothesized effects on the social system of a known body of information. 
Since the body of information circulates almost exclusively among mem-
bers of the object population, a nearly closed knowledge system can be 
presumed for purposes of analysis. The production and transmission of 
this information is of secondary interest and will be so treated. With 
this simple overview it can be seen that such a study is exploratory but 
researchable in nature. The sociology of knowledge has been, as a field, 
almost forgotten in the proliferating applications of empirical methods 
to heretofore philosophical pursuits. It is hoped that this type of re-
search can aid in the reversal of this trend. 
The following study is organized into five parts. The section en-
titled "Theoretical Requirements of an Empirical Sociology of Knowledge" 
seeks to establish a minimal theoretical grounding necessary for meaning-
ful research. It demands the creation of an empirical reference point 
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vis-a-vis knowledge consumption. The "Review of the Literature11 sketches 
the specific research available in the field. Included are studies of 
the social effects of knowledge and knowledge systems. The "Research 
Methodology" section details the source of the data, instruments of 
measurement, and procedures of the research design. The "Analysis of the 
Data" section describes the findings resulting from the measurements and 
comparisons. Finally, the "Sununary and Conclusions" briefly interpret 
the findings. The appendices and working bibliography appear at the con-
clusion of the study. 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN EMPIRICAL 
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The Development of the Sociology of Knowledge 
The birth of the sociology of knowledge is subject to some ques-
tion, for it developed in many locations over an extended period of time. 
Some date its origin with the philosophers of the Enlightenment, others 
from Comte's famous "law of the three stages," although the Comtean as-
sertion of a social structure-source of knowledge link is highly tenu-
ous. Moreover, the modern sociology of knowledge is a product of at 
least three distinct traditions. These schools will be traced from 
their origins and examined in their present contexts. 
The Marxians 
The first of these schools of thought concerns itself with issues 
involved in "historicism" or the "philosophy of history." Of this 
school, the immediate precursor was Marx; the Marxian view revolved 
about an hypothesis summarized by Marx and Engels in The Communist~-
festo (196li31) in these terms: 
What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intel-
lectual production changes its character in proportion as 
material production is changed? The ruling ideas of each 
age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class. 
The remarkable simplicity of the Marxian theorem--that material gives 
6 
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rise to non-material--probably accounts for its wide application by 
scholars. Indeed, as Wolff (1959) points out, most of what passed for 
the sociology of knowledge during its German zenith in the 1920's was 
either a defense or a refutation of Karl Marx. Apart from concerns with 
the problems of "historicism," Marx's lasting contribution resulted from 
his concern with ideologies and alienation, for Marx felt that the work-
ing man was a captive of ideological thought in the forms of theology, 
the State, and capitalism. He saw himself as dedicated to unmasking 
these captivating forms when in 1844 he wrote: 
The inunediate task is to unmask human lienation in its secular 
form, now that it has been unmasked in its sacred form. Thus 
the criticism of heaven is transformed into the criticism of 
earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, 
and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics. 
(Marx, 1956:53) 
The Marxian notion of ideology profoundly affected European sociology, 
although the European sociology of knowledge would steadfastly ignore 
another Marxian belief--that the physical and social sciences are free 
from ideological contamination--and would ultimately unite into a 11 true11 
science. Bottomore (1956: 56) attribut~s to Marx the statement that, 
"Natural science will one day incorporate the science of man, just as 
the science of man will incorporate natural science; there will be a 
single science." Such positivistic extremism ran counter to the main-
stream of subsequent European sociology of knowledge advocates. Most 
important, the Marxist school never surmounted the problem engendered 
by its own contention that ideology and knowledge are rooted in social 
structures. Thus, the Marxists' concern with "relativity" developed 
from their application of ideology as a weapon and a shibboleth. Light 
(1969:192) paraphrases their dilemma when he wrotes: 
The validity of a given set of ideas could easily be chall.enged 
by calling attention to the social position and interests of 
its adherents. But this type of determinism posed an unshake-
able dilemma~ If the root proposition of the sociology of 
knowledge--a one-to-one correspondence between knowledge and 
social position--was valid, then the sociology of knowledge 
was itself simply a reflection of the position and interests 
of its claimants. 
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Correspondingly, sociology of knowledge advocates came to depend increas-
ingly upon philosophical proofs and logical discourse to buttress their 
arguments. Only in the American sociology of knowledge, created in the 
last decade, would Marx's desire for an empirical sociology of knowledge 
be approached. 
The role of Karl Marx in the development of the sociology of know-
ledge is best sunnnarized by Rapoport (1964:101) when he writes: 
The idea of the sociology of knowledge was, I believe, Marx's 
greatest contribution. It will endure long after his economic 
theories (sophisticated in his day but primitive in the light 
of contemporary knowledge) and the sociological theory which 
bears his trademark (the class struggle) have become histori-
cal curiosities. The sociology of knowledge is to society 
what the psycho-analytic conceptualization of the unconscious 
is to the individual. 
Even so, it is likely that more plaudits will continue to be awarded to 
the limitators of Marx than to the theorist himself. 
Mannheim borrowed heavily from Marxian theory in order to explain 
collective attachments to ideologies. Marx had defined "ideologiesn as 
mainly lies and deceptions manipulated by the privileged boureoisie to 
defend class privileges. nFalse consciousness," then, was said by Marx 
to result from any acceptance of ideologies at odds with class interests. 
Marx and his followers claimed "true consciousness" in the form of per-
ceptions undistorted by class interests. Recent reinterpretations of 
Marx's theory of consciousness by Rennnling (1967:152) and others suggest 
a view of false consciousness as a product of worker alienation resulting 
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in beliefs and ideology systems not grounded in reality and acting upon 
man's imagination. 
The impact of this view is far-reaching, for it holds that the prob-
lem of the absolute relationship of thought to social structure cannot 
be resolved by attempts at "objectivity," even in areas such as history. 
Hegel (1954:13) defined the problem by saying: 
Even the average and mediocre historian, who perhaps believes 
and pretends that he is merely receptive, merely surrounding 
himself to the data, is not passive in his thinking. He brings 
his categories with him and sees the data through them. 
Mannheim saw the problem as a two-pronged one. First, that all knowledge 
was socially relative to the group that produced or conditioned it; and 
second, that the scientist could never be free of his own group influ-
ences and was thus prevented from knowing any pure knowledge. Mannheim 
accepted the dictum that no group produced ideas apart from their social 
context, although he thought the greatest likelihood to do so rested in 
a group of "free-floating'1 intellectuals (the intelligentsia of society). 
The idea of a frei schwebende intelligenz or a "socially unattached int el-
ligentsia" was not, however, originally from Mannheim, for, as Berger and 
Luckmann (1966~10) point out, Mannheim borrowed the term from Alfred 
Weber. Beyond this curiously naive proposition, the contributions of 
Mannheim have been sizeable, for it was principally through the tr'ansla-
tion of Mannheim's writings that non-German audiences were first exposed 
to the sociology of knowledge. Best known is Mannheim's ideology and 
Utopia (1936), in which systems of thought are said to mirror the per-
spectives of particular groups, thus allowing an interplay between 
Mannheim and Marx's social class consciousness theory. Mannheim dis-
tinguished two systems of social thought--ideologies (ways of masking 
the truth resulting from desires for equilibrium and stability) and 
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utopias (ways of thinking that arise in opposition to prevailing thought 
not directly reflecting socio-cultural environments, since they manifest 
tendencies toward "wish-fulfillment"). At issue in this vision is an 
understanding of the means by which individuals interpret social reality. 
That is, it m_ay be said that every group utilized utopian thought sys-
terns to order the realities they perceive. A utopia is true and valid 
if it can realistically subvert or overthrow the prevailing thought sys-
tern (the ideologies). If it has no real likelihood of doing so, a 
utopia may become simply another ideology for purposes of controlling 
the believers. Unlike Marx, Mannheim was willing to concede that other 
realities might also be valid, rather than simply attributing "true con-
sciousness" to Marxians and "false-consciousness" to all who disagree. 
Mannheim's (1936:264) definition of the sociology of knowledge has 
been widely quoted by historically-minded researchers. It reads: 
••• as theory it seeks to analyze the relationship between 
knowledge and existence; as historical-sociological research 
it seeks to trace the forms which this relationship has taken 
in the intellectual development of mankind. 
It is easy to see in Mannheim the reflection of the Marxist historicism 
frequently criticised as reductionism, as well as his attempt to escape 
from the accusation of "relati vi sm11 by calling it "relationi sm. 11 
The contributions of Mannheim are numerous, the most significant 
being that he brought the sociology of knowledge to the broad academic 
community. A sympathetic and knowledgeable treatment of Mannheim's 
theories may be found in Zeitlin (1968~281-320). 
Another latter-day Marxist who exhibited a profound interest in the 
sociology of knowledge was C. Wright Mills. Vitally interested in the 
philosophy of science, Mills saw the problem of the sociology of 
11 
knowledge as central to the pursuit of sociologists. In Mills' (1946) 
study of the ideological identifications of middle-class Americans, he 
concluded that middle-class businessmen maintained a strong identifica-
tion with big-business and its ideologies. Such a stance, at odds with 
immediate self~interests, was akin to the Marxian descriptions of "false 
consciousness." A similar analysis was later perfonned by Mills in 
White Collar (1951). An excellent picture of Mills' views appears in 
"The Scientific Relevance of C. Wright Mills" by Rapoport (1964). 
The products of the wide-spread discussion of Marxian causality are 
numerous, and only a small sampling is required to demonstrate its 
inter-disciplinary effects. Thorstein Veblen (1918) took great pains to 
point out the inter-relatedness of cultural values and intellectual ac-
tivities. In history, James Harvey Robinson (1921) took the lead of 
Mannheim in understanding the social origins of knowledge, while Charles 
A. Beard (1934) is widely known in both economics and history for his 
analyses of objective knowledge as a product of economic sub-structures. 
It was at the Marxian juncture, however, that the most popular no-
tion of the real speciality of the sociology of knowledge was introduced 
--the history of ideas. Rooted in the concept that the source of ideas 
and knowledge resides with social groups (social classes, elites, phi-
losophers, etc.), the proponents of this branch of study attempted to 
trace ideas fromtheir current development to their sources, examining 
~ route their growth and changes. Never claimed by history and widely 
disavowed by positivist sociology, the pursuit of the history of ideas 
existed in an intellectual limbo before seizing upon the sociology of 
knowledge label to grant legitimation to its endeavors. No longer 
widely seen as a legitimate goal of sociological research, the sociology 
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of ideas is frequently seen as a descriptive tool used in connection with 
other methods and procedures. 
~ Phenomenologists 
In other areas of the sociology of knowledge Marx is said to have 
sired the study of reality constructions with his preoccupations with 
religion's role in the social order. Zeitlin (1968:278) observes that 
Marx attributed to religion a false reality construction, often used for 
purposes of control. However, "phenomenology" is generally regarded less 
as a school of thought than a procedure for analysis in which the re-
searcher attempts to temporarily suspend all epistemological assumptions 
in order to more completely describe social situations. MacLeod (1968) 
states, "It is in phenomenology that the socio logy of knowledge has 
found its firmest links with philosophy; for, overshadowing phenomenology 
is a desire to grasp the nature of social reality. 
The popular works of Max Scheler, called by some the "Father of the 
Sociology of Knowledge" (Curtis and Petras, 1970: 16), attest to the rise 
of the second major tradition in the sociology of knowledge. Predating 
only slightly the publication of Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia (1936) 
was Scheler's "Problems in the Sociology of Knowledgen (1924). Becker 
and Barnes (1938:923) attribute Scheler's interest in the sociology of 
knowledge to his religious preoccupations, principally his belief that 
"Lutheranism arose primarily because the German princes did not wish to 
send a substantial part of their revenues south of the Alps." A critic 
of Marx, Scheler utilized a phenomenological orientation in his attempts 
to remake the sociology of knowledge into a form of cultural anthropolo-
gy. Essentially concerned with the nature of social knowledge, Scheler 
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served as the intellectual precursor of the phenomenological sociology 
of knowledge, later developed by Alfred Schutz and Peter Berger. Staude 
(1967) skillfully traces the intellectual and academic development of 
Scheler until his death in 1928. Staude attributes to Scheler a frus-
tration at the middle class's economic success and political impotence 
in Wilhelmian Germany. Scheler's admiration of the aristocracy and his 
disdain for individualism and utilitarianism lead him to refute science 
as a source of true knowledge and to reorder the authorities he saw 
governing society. As Mannheim had explained the Marxian concept of 
ideology to encompass all thought, Scheler used Marxian perceptions of 
ruling elites to generalize about all eras. 
Whereas Marx had attributed ideologies to economic and class roots, 
and Mannheim to a wider assortment of groupings, Scheler was even less 
restrictive. Scheler saw no stable source of ideas in human history; 
rather, he described a sequence of "real factors" which he said set up 
the necessary conditions for its production. These "real factors" which 
he described in detailed terms related to the degree of complexity of the 
society involved. Thus, the "real factors" in primitive society must be 
kinship affiliations while religious, political, and economic factors 
suffice in more complex societies. Scheler went a step further when he 
maintained that there exists an absolute order of values and ideals upon 
which certain individuals and groups may draw at those points in time 
when their proper "real factors" are present. The metaphysical bent of 
Scheler's writings reflected, as.Staude (1967:167) details, 11 ••• his 
old desire to destroy the prevailing cult of science as the ultimate 
norm of true knowledge." Further, his antipathy toward positivists lead 
Scheler to attack Durkheim (as seen in Staude [1967:166]) because: 
Durkheim completely failed to do justice to the actual nature 
of religious and metaphysical thinking, and therefore he could 
not properly understand the influences of social forms on re-
ligious and metaphysical systems. 
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Nevertheless, Scheler's writings laid the theoretical groundwork for an 
entire phenomenological approach to the sociology of knowledge, the re-
sult being to occasion a collection of writers who have expended great 
effort to understand the effects of material and non-material environment 
on constructions of social reality. 
The premature death of Ernest Grunwald at the age of twenty-one, re-
sulted in his written materials remaining largely untranslated from the 
native German. Grunwald's early volume dealing directly with the soci-
ology of knowledge (edited posthumously) is still translated only in 
part; two of his essays appear in Curtis and Petras, The Sociology of 
Knowledge: ~ Reader (1970). Grunwald there details his attempts to 
place the sociology of knowledge in a framework consistent with empirical 
fact and method while remaining consistent with Kantian concepts of 
causality. While he occasionally refers to the sociology of knowledge as 
a "science of reality," he is elsewhere less specific, as when he writes 
(Curtis and Petras, 1970:190)~ 
••• the sociology of knowledge 
schaften whose subject has something 
cognition, and thought. 
• is a Geisteswissen-
to do with knowledge, 
The reason for this is that Grunwald was sincere about leaving the de-
fining of the sociology of knowledge open-ended, often hinting that it 
might be more correct to use the term "sociology of culture." He did, 
however, reject Lehmann's (1931:284) unbounded definition which holds 
that the sociology of knowledge isg 
• science of the knowledge of the social (society as nexus 
of meaning and as imparting meaning), in so far as that know-
ledge is knowledge of culture and an expression of culture. 
15 
The basis of his rejection was Grunwald's feeling that a genuine soci~ 
ology of knowledge must integrate a positivist method with phenomenolog-
ical interests in multiple realities in order to probe the connections 
and relevancies of societal membership. He opts for a positivistic 
stand because he rejects Mannheim's "relationism" as a perspective, say-
ing (Curtis and Petras, 1970:240)~ 
The 'middle ground' between relativism and absolutism on which 
relationism stands thus turns out to be an illusion. Relati-
ism and absolutism are contradictory opposites with no more 
'middle ground' between them than exists between true and false, 
yes and no. 
The contribution of Grunwald was to sharpen definitions and demand a 
clarification of concepts, a procedure badly needed in the sociology of 
knowledge today. 
To Alfred Schutz should go much of the credit for bringing the 
phenomenological sociology of knowledge out of the metaphysical arena 
and into sociological contexts. Schutz' best work remains his 1932 
book, Der sinnahafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt, only recently published 
in English (1967) as The Phenomenology of the Social World. In this 
book many previously vague concepts of phenomenology are clarified, as 
well as an attempt made to bring Max Weber into phenomenological focus. 
Calling his approach "interpretative sociology," he says (1967~248)~ 
The primary task of this science is to describe the processes 
of meaning-establishment and meaning-interpretation as these 
are carried out by individuals living in the social world. 
Schutz made an enormous conceptual leap when he advocated the removal of 
the focus from universal ideation systems. Instead, he suggested the 
study of concrete perceptions of phenomena by real (and common) people 
in society, or what Mannheim called the "pre-scientific, inexact mode of 
thought" (1936: 2). Schutz (1967~ 219) approached the modern empirical 
position when he wrote: 
The greater art of the sociologist, consists in his attempt 
always to relate changes in mental attitudes to changes in 
social situations. The human mind does not operate .!!2 
vacuo ••• 
The insistence by Schutz that symbols play a key role in an analysis, 
16 
points in the direction of Durkheim's positivistic linguistics (recently 
revived as a branch of anthropological "ethnomethodology") and Mead and 
Cooley's social psychology. 
The prominence of Schutz and his role in the development of a so-
ciology of knowledge perspective in social research has been enhanced in 
recent years. In 1970, Social Research dedicated an issue to Schutz 
(see "Essays in Conunemoration of Alfred Schutz," Berger, 1970) containing 
excellent reviews of Schutz's phenomenological approach applied to social 
change, international politics, and the mass media in Japan. Natanson 
(1968) provides the finest brief synopsis of Schutz' s theories and his 
significance to social science. 
A pivotal book,~. Social Construction of Reality by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966), serves as a transitional work, successfully bridging 
the gap between phenomenology and modern sociological perspectives. 
Berger and Luckmann attempt to lay sufficient theoretical groundwork to 
allow empirical research into the process by which society creates a 
transcendent definition of objective reality. The real beginnings of 
such a definition, they say, are rooted in the problem-solving subjecti-
fication (meaning attachment to cultural elements) by individuals. The 
broader acceptance of attached meanings results in acceptance by society 
in everyday life of the elements' meaning as objective reality. Children 
are thereafter socialized to accept this meaning as objectively real, 
lending legitimation to such organizational components as social 
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institutions and behavior. Berger and Luckmann reject the kinds of know-
ledge suggested for study by Durkheim, Gurvitch, or Machup to create 
their own dichotomy of important knowledge: knowledge of everyday or 
connnonsense things used by individuals in conducting their daily affairs. 
Like Alfred Schutz, the authors concede primary significance to this 
brand of knowledge, saying that while all such knowledge is not dupli-
cated by members of society, there are certain areas of overlap. Thus 
(Schutz, 1967:15), 
• the sociology of knowledge must first of all concern 
itself with what people 'know' as 'reality' in their every-
day non- or pre-theoretical lives. In other words, connnon-
sense 'knowledge' rather than 'ideas' must be the central 
focus for the sociology of knowledge. 
Yet for the member of society relying upon this form of thought there 
are two limitations that perforce transform it into theoretical know-
ledge. First, that connnonsense knowledge must be transferred to sue-
ceeding generations, and second it becomes manifestly unsatisfactory as 
a tool for generalizing about matters of wider scope such as human moti-
vation and social causation. Thus, the second kind of knowledge de-
scribed by Berger and Luckmann consists of: the institutional legitima-
tions of reality constructions. Legitimations from the church, the 
schools, and similar sources are theoretical in nature and much less 
specific than everyday knowledge, for it need not necessarily be spe-
cific in order to serve its principal purpose--relating everyday exis-
tence to a broader universe. • 
Since Berger and Luckmann reject the Marxist concept that the soci-
ology of knowledge should simply study social perceptions rooted in ob-
jective social positions, they opt for a study of the process by which 
knowledge is created, questioned, and discarded. Such an approach 
. 
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neatly blunts the relativism of Marx which Mannheim's 11 relationism11 
failed to resolve. Berger and Luckmann have not, however, created an 
impregnable position, for at least one reviewer, Light (1969), faults 
the authors for their conservatism, saying that they used Comte's as-
sumptions about knowledge to derive their theory. More fundamentally, 
Light accuses Berger and Luckmann of using the wrong point of origin for 
the analysis of change. Berger and Luckmann maintain that periods of 
calm and certainty result from widespread acceptance of institutionali-
zed definitions of objective reality that protect them from what the 
authors call the "onslaught of nightmare" (1966: 102) or being forced to 
admit that reality definitions are indeed arbitrary. A cycle occurs 
when the public begins to doubt old definitions; a period of anxiety 
ensues, and the uncertainty is resolved when a new motif is in,stalled to 
explain existential reality, be it theological, metaphysical, rational, 
scientific, etc. Light says that Berger and Luckmann perceive of periods 
of stability temporarily disrupted by uncertainty, while Light maintains 
that the period of uncertainty has been the most productive and meaning-
ful, suggesting a "sociology of uncertainty" (1969: 195) as an alterna-
tive. Despite his criticism, Light offers the best critique of The 
Social Construction of Reality when he writes (1969:197): 
••• what is the moral of Berger and Luckmann' s stoil'."y? It 
is that objective certainty in human cognition is an illu-
sion, that knowledge is in a constant process of evolution. 
The contributions of Berger and Luckmann to the sociology of knowledge 
have been recognized to consist of (1) the formulation of conceptual 
tools for treating abstracted and difficult problems and, (2) the in-
corporation of social psychology and empiricist sociology under the 
sociology of knowledge banner. 
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Appearing at approximately the same time as Berger and Luckmann's 
book was Reality Construction in Society by Holzner (1968). Little used, 
Holzner's theoretical efforts are ambitious indeed, for he desires to 
integrate the study of reality construction into a general social sys-
terns approach. He writes in the preface (1968: i), "Throughout the book 
the concept of 'social system' is of central importance." 
A concern with understanding the mechanics of reality constructions 
has encouraged many new perspectives. Chapman (1971) posits the view 
that the materials for the construction of social reality are (contra-
dictory to Scheler) infinite, including magic, religion, rationality, 
science, and myth, to name but a few. The broader uses of such an 
understanding can be seen when Chapman (1971:1) writes: 
The task of sociological theory is to explain the many ways in 
which reality is socially structured and restructured, so that 
as far as possible a general understanding of the bases of 
social thought and action may be achieved. 
Psychologist George A. Kelly (1956) made novel use of such a technique 
in psychoanalysis based on the principle (Sahakian, 1969:358) that~ 
••• Psychotherapy is a matter of reconstruction, replacing 
ineffective constructs [of reality] with suitable ones, re-
placing threatening constructs with compatible constructs. 
Further recent developments include the creation of psycho- and socio-
linguistics techniques and the wedding of symbolic interactionism with 
reality construction research. 
The phenomenological frame of reference has developed into a stan-
dard conceptual tool in sociology, being applied to all manner of socio-
logical problems. Sjoberg and Nett (1968), Circourel (1964), and Den-
zin (1970) present the problems of research methodology in a sociology 
of knowledge perspective, Denzin including readings by a broad range of 
theorist/methodologists under the umbrella of the sociology of knowledge. 
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Textbooks are appearing in profusion with allusions to the meaningful in-
terpretations of constructions including Reynolds and Reynolds (1970), 
Douglas (1970), Tiryakian (1971), Phillips (1971), and Horowitz and 
Strong ( 1971). 
The Empiricist 
A third major tradition in the sociology of knowledge concerns it-
self with the understanding and measurement of the direct effects of 
knowledge. The modern form of this branch is distinctly French and 
American, and has attained its most significant success in utilizing a 
sociology of knowledge framework as a tool for the analysis of other 
substantive areas. 
It is to Innnanuel Kant that this area owes its perspectives, for 
until the appearance of Kant, the philo sop hi cal and scientific world had 
been wrestling with the opposing doctrines of empiricism versus ration-
alism. The empiricist held that the source of all knowledge was sensory 
experience, while the rationalist held that scientific knowledge could 
never arrive via the senses, resulting in the assumption that scientific 
knowledge was the product of reason. Kant attempted to synthesize the 
two approaches, resulting in his primary question--Is knowledge based on 
~ priori cognition, pure reason, or obtained by sensory experience? Se-
lecting from each argument only what he considered valid, Kant arrived 
at the epistemological problem summarized by Remmling (1967:57): 
How can statements derived neither from experience (i.e. 
judgments~ priori) nor from logical inference (analytic 
judgments) attain the status of objective knowledge 
(synthetic judgments)? 
Kant was working toward a resolution of ontological and phenomenological 
bickering in order to arrive at an understanding of reality. His problem 
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was compounded because, even if one accepts an absolute ongoing reality 
(a noumena), the process of conceptualization makes it the product of 
epistemology (phenomena). Noumena cannot enter the mind except as phe-
nomena, for the thing in itself cannot enter the mind. Kant located 
reality in the mind such that the object is recreated (although not ma-
terially) in the mind of the human observer. The rational knowledge of 
absolute reality is impossible, and for the sociology of knowledge the 
task (outlined by Mannheim's reformulation of Kantian thought) is to 
understand that knowledge is filtered through the perceptional senses of 
the individuals. Mannheim writes (1936:269): 
The world is known through many different orientations because 
there are many simultaneous and mutually contradictory trends 
of thought ••• struggling against one another with their 
different interpretations of 'common' experience. The clue 
to this conflict, therefore, is not to be found in the 'ob-
ject in itself' (if it were, it would be impossible to under-
stand why the object should appear in so many different re-
fractions), but in the very different expectations, purposes, 
and impulses arising out of experience. 
Such a viewpoint aiming at the existence of multiple realities is an 
empiricist foundation of significance. It legitimates the study of at-
titudes, values, ideas, opinions, other expressions of group viewpoints, 
and all other phenomenological elements so reified, because they are 
thus, the reality perceptions serving as the behavioral basis. 
The .scientific father of this branch is generally held to be Emile 
Durkheim. Durkheim's sociology of knowledge contributions came about as 
he probed the origins of typologies among pre-literate social organiza-
tions, concluding that the classifications were reflections of the so-
cial structure extant in the society ( see Durkheim and Mauss, 1903). 
While he failed to establish the sources of social classifications in 
primitive life or later in complex society (Durkheim, 1954), he did 
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serve to encourage others to engage in empirical pursuits; the bulk of 
his imitators were anthropologists and ethnologists. 
Always interested in religion, Durkheim was further lead to ques-
tion the nature of knowledge as a binder of society. That is, that 
there are certain kinds of social knowledge about which there is no 
freedom of choice or rational options. He lumped these kinds of know-
ledge into categories and exhorted his followers to discover the social 
manifestations of them. Durkheim divided theorists (about knowledge) 
into two kinds: (1) ~ priorists who assume social knowledge to be given 
and unquestionable, and (2) the empiricists who see all knowledge as re-
searchable. His categories of social knowledge would, he claimed, sat-
isfy both groups, saying (1954:19): 
The categories are no longer considered as primary and unan-
alyzable facts, yet they keep a complexity which falsifies 
any analysis as ready as that with which the empiricists 
content themselves. 
Duckheim' s position on the subject was suggested when he wrote (1954~ 
20): 
••• to succeed in understanding them and judging them 
[his categories of knowledge], it is necessary to resort 
to other means than those which have been in use up to 
the present. 
Although writings on the subject of knowledge comprise only a small por-
tion of Durkheim's total output, a clear picture of his perceptions of 
the effects of the socio-historical and socio-cultural environments on 
thought may be obtained in his book, The !_lementary Forms of the Re-
ligious Life (1954). Durkheim's preoccupations with classifications of 
knowledge did result in a spin-off in the form of recurring attempts to 
classify kinds of knowledge, extending to very recently. Bottomore 
(1956: 56) evidences such an effect when he states that, "The first step 
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towards an empirical sociology of knowledge must be a classification of 
types of knowledge." Such categorizations include that performed by 
Gurvitch (1956~56), who stressed that the kinds of knowledge he saw ex-. 
tant had received grossly unequal amounts of study and research, includ-
ing: perpetual knowledge of the external world, knowledge of other per-
sons and groups, conunonsense knowledge, technical knowledge, political 
knowledge, scientific knowledge, and philosophical knowledge. Machup 
(1962: 21-22) details his own list of knowledge classes divided into five 
main categories: 
(1) Practical knowledge: useful in his work, his decisions, 
and actions; can be subdivided, according to his activities, 
into: 
a. Professional knowledge 
b. Business knowledge 
c. Workman's knowledge 
d. Political knowledge 
e. Household knowledge 
f. Other practical knowledge 
(2) Intellectual knowledge~ satisfying his intellectual 
curiosity ••• 
(3) Small-talk and pastime knowledge~ satisfying the non-
intellectual curiosity ••• light entertainment and emo-
tional stimulation ••• 
(4) Spiritual knowledge 
(5) Unwanted knowledge 
Yet no matter how exhaustive the listing, the frustrations of Durkheim 
recur, for nowhere can the range of human thought be categorically 
listed. 
The most lasting contribution of Durkheim has been to inspire other 
empirical analyses, without which, the sociology of knowledge might still 
founder in the quagmires of philosophical relativism. An example in-
eludes Florian Znaniecki' s The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge (1940~ 
318), wherein he asks: 
Are the systems of knowledge which scientists build and their 
methods of building them influenced by the social patterns 
wfth which scientists are expected to conform as participants 
in a certain social order and by the ways in which they ac-
tually realize those patterns? 
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In Cultural Reality (1919), Znaniecki dealt with the philosophical im-
pact of relativism. In Chapter III are-presented numerous examples of 
specific studies utilizing the most rigorous of methodological tools, 
all heir to the Durkheimian tradition in the sociology of knowledge. 
One of the most profound effects of this branch of the sociology of 
knowledge is that which affected the American behaviorist school of so-
ciology and pragmatists in psychology. Typical of the latter is John 
Dewey, whose contributions have been but recently recognized (see Curtis 
and Petras, 1970). Influenced by the French school of social psychology 
and positivist sociology, Dewey was concerned with the influence of the 
group on the individual mind. In essense, Dewey reiterated the ideas of 
Durkheim that no individual can be free from the powers of the 11 collec-
tive reality" encompassed by the group mind, and further excluded all 
forms of consciousness not gained through thought. Thus, said Dewey, the 
human mind (through language) mediates the individual's relationship with 
ontological reality. Language is naturally seen as indispensable to the 
process; the suggestion being that the researcher should seek to under-
stand the processes of language. Characteristic of Dewey's philosophy 
of knowledge is German. Phi~. and Politics (1915), and Reconstruction 
in Philosophy (1920). 
William James, one of the founders of American pragmatism is repre-
sentative of that body of philosophers in his era who were very much 
concerned with the construction of social reality. James realized that 
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although individuals integrate their perceptions of reality, there are, 
in fact, many categories of reality and non-reality or illusion. The 
individual mind treats these through a form of compartmentalization, for 
James (1952: 641) says: 
••• within the world of absolute reality ••• there is the 
world of collective error, there are the worlds of abstract 
reality, of relative or practical reality, of ideal reality 
and there is the supernatural world. The popular mind con-
ceives of all these sub-worlds more or less disconnectedly; 
and when dealing with one of them, forgets for the time being 
its relations to the rest. 
James later describes and enumerates a number of sub-universes of reality 
which, he said, the psychologist should be charged with understanding. 
He lists the following sub-universes of reality (1952:641-642): (1) 
sensory experience or physical reality; (2) science and similar explana-
tory constructions; (3) "ideal relations" in the form of logic, mathe-
matics, etc.; (4) the "world of 'idols of \:he tribe"' or illusions com-
man to race and group; (5) supernatural worlds of all religious bents; 
( 6) "various worlds of individual opinion, as numerous as men are;" and 
(7) "the worlds of sheer madness and vagary, also indefinitely numer- · 
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A cultural element becomes real, says James, when emotionally ac-
tive interest is direct.ed toward it. Thus, the role of emotion is key 
in James' theory of reality construction, an element often missing in 
overly rational descriptions of many theorists. We tend, according to 
James, to temporarily shift from one sub-universe to the other through-
out our lives, and as each is taken as real, each sub-universe is 
genuinely regarded as real. Reality is. in the minds of the individuals, 
and the social scientist who concerns himself with an ongoing ontologi-
cal reality beyond that of the individual is engaging in largely wasted 
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activity. Such a concept comprises a connnon thread in the writings of 
reality constructionists, from Durkheim to Berger and Luckmann. 
Another of the school's founders is George Herbert Mead. His view 
that the "self" is created through the mediation of "significant symbolslV 
yields the conclusion that the self-concept, above and beyond intellec-
tualized learning, is inexorably linked to the social environment. In 
"Society as Symbolic Interaction" (1962), Herbert Blumer outlines the 
operational premises by which Mead explained social actions. Present 
always, says Mead, is a body of social and scientific knowledge to which 
the individual must respond (including customs, traditions, manners, and 
norms, etc.) and upon which he bases his actions. In doing so, the 
individual interprets knowledge relative to his unique personal situa-
tions. Much knowledge is internalized with little interpretation, but 
some forms demand extensive interpretation. The mind is seen only as it 
manifests itself in action, for only in acts between individuals is the 
mind observable. Mead states in his classic Mind, Self, and Society 
(1934:156) that the development of social knowledge is a direct and ob-
vious function of the process of 11 self"-creation. He writes: 
The self-conscious human individual, then, takes or assumes 
the organized social attitudes of the given social group or 
connnunity (or of some one section thereof) to which he be-
longs, toward the social problems of various kinds which 
confront that group or connnunity at any given time, and which 
arise in connection with the correspondingly different social 
projects or organized co-operative enterprises in which that 
group or community as such is engaged; and as an individual 
participant in these social projects or co-operative enter-
prises, he governs his own conduct accordingly. 
This is a social behavioristic restatement of a Marxian concept. The 
impact of Mead is that he formalized a number of presuppositions in the 
sociology of knowledge and social psychology, upon which he, and later 
Blumer, constructed theories of symbolic interactionism. A synopsis of 
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Mead's inputs may be seen.in '~he Contributions of George Herbert Mead 
to the Sociology of Knowledge" by McKinney (1955). 
Of his intellectual inspiration, Charles Horton Cooley is said to 
have most admired Darwin's patient empiricism and James' open pragmatism 
among all the,y,7ritings he encountered (see Angell, 1968). His early 
. ''-.,., ... 
work on ecological influences cond:itioned his later work on psycho-
sociological causation, and while principally concerned with the manner 
in which social individuals create self-concepts and how societies or-
ganize, Cooley went out of his way to emphasize the role of social ex-
perience and knowledge on human behavior. In "Genuis, Fame and the Com-
parison of the Races" (1897), Cooley stressed that society and its know-
ledge (in contrast to Galton's prevailing eugenics theories) produced 
great men. Most useful in his article on "The Roots of Social Know-
ledge" (1926) in which, after differentiating between social and material 
knowledge, the author (Cooley, 1926g 60) describes social knowledge asg 
sympathetic, or in its more active forms, as dramatic, 
since it is apt to consist of a visualization of behavior 
accompanied by imagination of corresponding mental processes. 
Cooley's definition is consistent with his theories of socialization, 
and social action, as well as recent dramaturgical social definitions 
(see Goffman, 1959). Further, he considers the process of objectifica-
tion when he writes (1926g6l) that social knowledge is"· •• quite as 
useful [as material knowledge] in the everyday affairs of life, and 
quite as universally accepted as real by connnon sense." The source of 
this social knowledge, he stresses, is the reciprocal interactions that 
collectively equal socialization. Thus, the psycho-socio-physical re-
sponses to the environment may be taken as a principle source of social 
knowledge. Cooley stresses that this is only a partial awareness of 
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whole human beings and a partial construction of reality. Although 
aware of the fact that all knowledge is subjective (so far as it is not 
ontological), Cooley fails to make the Marxian connection--that knowledge 
is a function of underlying social structures. The reason for this is 
that Cooley, by his own definition, is a behaviorist. The implication 
is that Cooley would not busy himself with what cannot be observed, and 
yet, Cooley cannot be so easily written off, for he uses Herodotus's ac-
counts to point up the differential cultural us~s of knowledge (see 
Cooley, 1926:71-72). Further, in the analysis of the ordinal evalua-
tions of statistical, scientific, and other kinds of social knowledge, 
Cooley points out that the functional accuracy of knowledge is determined. 
by society's acceptance of it. While Cooley's writings include many 
leads, his contributions suffered from his failure to pursue a systematic 
theoretical construction. 
The contributions of structural-functionalism to the sociology of 
knowledge have been spotty and uneven. Despite his classical German 
education, the leading exponent of systemic-functionalism, Talcott Par-
sons has written only one short treatise on the subject. In An Approach 
~ the Sociology of Knowledge (1959), Parsons quickly rules out Scheler, 
Mannheim and the German idealists as being either dichotomous in their 
thinking, or 11unscientific." Rather, he sees the sociology of knowledge 
as modeled properly after Max Weber's objectivism and Durkheim's con-
cerns with collective mentalities. He curiously compares his theoretical 
stance with that of Werner Stark (1958) who subtitles his book, "An Es-
say in Aid of A Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas,n and sug-
gests that the real issue is "absolute" truth, a sociology of truth 
rather than the errors in thinking. Stark's sociology of knowledge is a 
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distinct attempt to renounce the pain of relativism in favor of the com-
forts of absolutism. Yet Parsons never explains this incongruity or how 
he links his theoretical view with that of Stark. What Parsons does is 
to place human action in a mechanistic system constituted of sy-stems 
isomorphic at every level of analysis--envisioned as a pyramid consisting 
of culture, society, personality, and organism. While he suggests that 
the study of reality constructions would be valuable, Parsons says that 
the real subject of the sociology of knowledge is the study of the social 
functions of ideology. He lists these functions as (1) the maintenance 
of role connnitments by individuals, (2) facilitation of the broad accept-
ance of "men of knowledge," and (3) the establishment of a connnon high-
level ground for ideological debate, all the while granting pre-eminence 
to the first (see Parsons, 1959~45-46). Parsons' stress on institution-
alized value-relationships in the social system of Parsons' world results 
in an absence of any empirical effort to study 11meaning11 as perceived by 
the society and individuals. 
Robert K. Merton, on the other hand, is generally credited with the 
stimulation of American discussion of the sociology of knowledge when, 
in his major work Social Theory and Social Structure (1957), he devotes 
two chapters to the sociology of knowledge, the principal one entitled, 
"Paradigm for the Sociology of Knowledge. 11 In this chapter, Merton in-
terprets the sociology of knowledge as a response to four questions~ 
( 1) "Where is the existential basis of mental productions located? 
." [that is, social and cultural bases], (2) "What mental productions 
are being sociologically analyzed? ••• " [ spheres of moral beliefs, 
ideologies, ideas analyzed in terms of levels of abstractions, presup-
positions, etc.], (3) "How are mental productions related to the 
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existential bases? ••• " [through causal, symbolic, and ambiguous re-
lations], (4) "Why? Manifest and latent functions imputed to these 
existentially conditioned mental productions ••• 11 (5) "When do the im-
puted relations of the existential base and knowledge obtain? It 
[historicist theories or general analytical theories]. Merton also 
utilized his manifest and latent dichotomy for the realm of ideation, in 
which he distinguishes between those bits of knowledge that are con-
sciously and unconsciously held. Merton's approach has been applied 
successfully to research by Warren (1971) in his analysis of urban prob-
lems entitled "The Sociology of Knowledge and the Problems of the Inner 
Cities." 
The principal distinction between Merton and Parsons can be seen by 
Merton's attempt to include the broadest range of predecessors in his 
working paradigm (including Marx, Scheler, Durkheim, and Mannheim), and 
his open-ended approach which even finds a comfortable niche for Soro-
kin1s idealistic and emanationistic theories. Useful is Merton's adap-
tation of Scheler's knowledge typology, where he concludes that an em-
pirical sociology of knowledge is a practicable if not a simple possi-
bility. Merton was adaptable enough to exclude the narrow absolutism 
of Marx, or Scheler's relativism while giving a fair treatment of ob-
jective and subjective approaches. It was the inclusion of Merton's 
sociology of knowledge chapters which has helped to diminish the dis-
tinctly European flavor that the sociology of knowledge has borne from 
its inception. 
The contributions of Kurt Wolff to the sociology of knowledge were 
not restricted to his role as a compiler of sources, for his well-known 
article, "The Sociology of Knowledge and Sociological Theory" (1959), 
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has served many as a relevant introduction into the present frame of 
reference. In it, he steered a neutral course between Marxian relativism 
and flights into social nominalism. More importantly, Wolff attempted to 
diminish the distinctly European flavor of the SOfiology of knowledge by 
integrating the psychological theories of the French,. {amiliar to socio-
logists, with German philosophers, while using as the connecting thread 
Merton's paradigm for the study of the sociology of knowledge. Wolff's 
writings tend to raise more pertinent questions than they answer, and, 
in doing so, force the reader to critique all positions. Yet he assumed 
some affirmative stances with regard to the question of the proper study 
of the sociology of knowledge. Wolff maintains that the study of the 
history of ideas or ideology is not the main province of the sociology 
of knowledge; rather, the sociology of knowledge must devote itself to 
understanding all uses of human knowledge. 
Critics of the Sociology of Knowledge 
As the foremost critic of the sociology of knowledge, Karl Popper 
consistently leveled stinging criticisms at both the theory and the 
methods of the field. His principal attacks revolved around the philo-
sophical assumptions of the sociology of knowledge, for in his major 
work he devoted an entire chapter to the question of whether the indi-
vidual mind can differentiate truth from error. Popper says that the 
idea that motivates the sociology of knowledge is a Hegelian version of 
Kantian theories of knowledge. Such a theory holds that only through 
the imperfections of the senses are we prevented from knowing true onto-
logical reality. Popper calls this a "bucket theory of the mind" (1950~ 
399). Most of Popper's scorn is reserved for the discussions of 
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relativism among Marxian and nee-Marxian scholars along with those 
questioning historicist assumptions. He writes that the Marxian basis 
of the sociology of knowledge transforms the field into a Nietzschean 
"debunking" enterprise~. seeking hi:dden motives everywhere while unable 
to distinguish the honest from the fraudulent. Popper gives the social-
ogy of knowledge the benefit of the doubt, saying that it serves one po-
sitive functfve function (1950~210): 
••• The sociology of knowledge hopes to reform the social 
sciences by making__ the social scientists aware of the social 
forces and ideologies which consistently beset them. 
Yet Popper is largely ineffective for several reasons. First, he is in-
capable of distinguishing between the Marxian study of ideoJ-ogy as a 
debunking act, and a scientific concern with the social effects and uses 
of knowledge. Second, Popper is unable to conceive of an objective and 
empirical sociology of knowledge, because his extensive critiques of 
Marxist thought have lead him adrift in relativism. This can be demon-
strated by Popper's statement (1950:403) that,"·,. • there is no doubt 
that we are all suffering under our own system of prejudices ••• that 
we accept. uncritically." Finally, Popper is a captive of the 
dialecticism of objectivity versus subjectivity. Knowledge, as Popper 
maintains, need not always be studied using either polar extreme as a 
guiding principle. 
Other critics of the sociology of knowledge have been motivated by 
a misinterpretation of the scope of the field. For instance, Gerard 
De Gre'(l941) is widely quoted in response to the problems of objectifi-
cation of knowledge. Yet, De Gre'operates under the assumption that the 
sociology of knowledge is a study of the history of ideas and ideolo-
gies. De Gre'is correct to remark that the slogan, ·11A man is a product 
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of his time," is sufficient theoretical justification for such --research, 
but the author's vehemence is misdirected. 
The criticisms of Arthur Child (1944) similarly revolve aroun_d the 
fiction that the sociology of knowledge deals exclusively with the social 
role of ideology. He concerns himself _with the problem of imputation· 
which involves the tendency of writers to impute certain ideas and ideo-
logies to groups. In question is the intention and motivation of the 
observer. The students of Marx point out that, so long as ideology is 
viewed as a venal cause to be unmasked, no one is free of that position's 
built-in dilenuna--that the observer, too, is captive of an ideology. 
Consequently, many writers and critics in the sociology of knowledge 
(including Child) have failed to strike the core issues because they 
have become entangled in the mechanics of ideological processes. While 
it is true that the study of ideology is a part of the sociology of 
knowledge, it is only one portion of the broad spectrum of knowledge. 
Another essayist, Frartk E. Hartung (1952), is dedicated only to a 
critical rendering of Mannheim's works. Focusing on Mannheim's con-
tention that sociologists should attempt to ascertain the existential 
influences on thought using empirical means, Hartung reduces this pro-
position to a simple statement (1952~17)~ 
Mannheim seems to be restating Hume's proposition that reason 
is and ought only to be the slave of the passions ••• [he] 
has attempted to sociologize psychoanalysis and has encountered 
in an insuperable form all of the difficulties involved in a 
literal translation of individualistic psychological terms 
into the collective terms of sociology. 
More fundamentally, he argues that a knowledge of thought and ideologies 
is not tantamount to predictions of social action. It is doubtful that 
either Mannheim or Marx intended such specific-general relationships to 
be deduced. That Hartung accuses Mannheim of failure to produce 
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empirical proofs, is less a mark of Mannheim's incapacities than of the 
absence of methods of acquiring such proofs. Valid is Hartung's criti-
cism that the search for 11 true knowledge" and faith in socially unat-
tached intellectuals free from ideology is wasted effort. 
Finally, too much can be made of the writings of critics for two 
reasons. First, the primary and central significance of the sociology 
of knowledge is demonstrated by the number of critics and their vocifer-
ous attacks. Most freely admit that the sociology of knowledge holds, 
not only promise of, but the present understanding to impart a valuable 
reference point to sociology. But most critics assume that the sociology 
of knowledge can do so only if it pursues its goal in the manner criti-
cally prescribed. Second, the importance of the sociology of knowledge 
is demonstrated by the fact that most critics would misdirect the efforts 
of the field for either mistaken or ideological reasons. That such a 
misallocation of effort should have persisted for so long, is due to the 
tendencies of recent sociologists to drift into heavily empirical fields, 
or of going into theoretical research to restrict themselves to formal 
or nominalist pursuits. 
Today's Sociology of Knowledge 
Extensive use has been made in the past twenty years of the princi-
pals of what might be termed an "empirical phenomenology. 11 Most obvious 
among them have been the linguists (anthropological, sociological, and 
psychological) and ethnomenthodologists. Among these are Chomsky (1957), 
Goodenough (1956), and Frake (1956). These anthropological-linguists 
have taken to heart (and base their research upon) an awareness of Berger 
and Luckmann' s (1966~ 13) thesis that, "The sociology of knowledge must 
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concern itself with everything that passes for iknowledge' in society. 11 
Consequently, a school of anthropology has surfaced, called "cognitive 
anthropology," presuming a bracketing of the researcher's perceptions of 
knowledge. They also insist upon substitution of an open-ended systemi-
zation in the place of former approaches during research. Its method 
stresses the importance of the socio-cultural base and in turn the socio-
cultural uses of knowledge. Offshoots of the ethnomethodological frame 
of reference are proliferating and fruitful, including the scaling of 
semantic space attempted by Osgood, et al. (1957), and the psycho-
therapeutic utilizations of reality constructions by Kelly (1956). The 
parameters of sociology of knowledge applications are expanding briskly, 
suggesting that there is a need of and a demand for the sociology of 
knowledge as a conceptual window, 
Large numbers of studies ar~ distinguishable utilizing some combi-
nation of the three traditions outlined. Boskoff (1969~307-337) does an 
excellent job of describing the state of impirical research into theore-
tical problems using the sociology of knowledge perspective. Wanderer 
(1969) is an example of recent attempts to concretely measure in language 
the common structural properties of thoughts (in this case of Spinoza and 
Euclid) through Guttman scaling techniques. 
In 1950, Popper (1950~21~) noted in the sociology of knowledge 
tendencies toward a Nietzschean "debunking" resting on the philosophical 
presuppositions of Kant and Hegel. It is interesting that such an ap-
proach has been revived in the form of Friedrich's acclaimed~ Sociology 
of Sociology (1970), using Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms as a 
point of departure. Friedrich's book suggests that the sociology of 
knowledge has come full circle and returned to Marx's goal of unmasking 
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ideological captives; this, however, is not quite the case. The soci~ 
ology of knowledge now connnands tools, perspectives, and a broadened 
constituency never possessed by the Marxians, The result is that the 
sociology of knowledge is fast moving to the fore of sociological con-
cerns. 
Fuse (1967), in an article detailing the current state and prospects 
of the sociology of knowledge, takes as a starting point the writings of 
Mannheim and Marx, Using Merton's European and American dichotomies, 
Fuse reaches these conclusions: (1) the sociology of knowledge is of 
value in the study of historical sociology and the history of sociologi-
cal theory, (2) the sociology of knowledge generates seminal hypotheses, 
(3) Mannheim's theory of political creations has been useful and may be 
again. Such observations tend to be valid only in part, since the so-
ciology of knowledge has long since moved beyond the paradigms of Mann-
heim, Marx, and other founders. Rather, the specific roots and uses of 
knowledge are being probed from various perspectives using sound empiri-
cal methods to the exclusion of philosophical proofs, 
In conclusion, it is necessary to say that the sociology of know-
ledge is so vast that no adequate analysis is possible within reasonable 
restrictions of space, Walter (1967~335) echoes the frustration when he 
writes: 
Of treatises on the sociology of knowledge there is no end, 
The catalogued list of scholarly books, articles, and mono-
graphs is already innnense and the con~lusion is not yet in 
sight, Nor is there any refragable consensus as to what the 
subject is all about; what ist distinctive 'scope and 
method' is to borrow the bland and evasive cliche academic 
officials use in compiling college curricula. 
Consequently, the delineation of and understanding of the field is made 
very difficult for the novice. For the adept, the matter of sheer 
37 
selection of definitions, concepts, and approaches is overwhelming. 
Research Position 
This study seeks to utilize a theoretical stance incorporating fea-
tures from each of the schools of thought. It should be noted that the 
sociology of knowledge does not itself possess a body of theory so 
labeled. It is, more accurately, a framework for analysis and a point 
of reference. 
The sources of knowledge as understood by Marxian (class-specific) 
or Mannheimian (ideological-utopian) theorists are too narrow. Rather, 
the sources of social knowledge are infinite. As Znaniecki and Mills 
point out, the relevance of scientific and metaphysical knowledge is ob-
vious and related. Chapman (1971) includes as sources of knowledge and 
as material for reality constructions a list containing magic, religion, 
myth, education, and more. However, at this time the epistemological 
problems associated with the phenomenological school allow only theoret-
ical application, due to the dirth of methodological outlets. The em-
piricist school does not provide better answers, only superior means of 
answering when properly manipulated. 
The sociology of knowledge advocate is compelled to demonstrate that 
a researcher's theoretical assumptions and methods are dependent upon how 
he views society. For instance, Mannheim (1936: 2) wrote, nThe principle 
thesis of the sociology of knowledge is that there are modes of thought 
which cannot be adequately understood as long as their social origins are 
obscured." Such a macro- to micro-social approach, long seen as the 
province of the history of ideas, is properly suited to the historicist 
inclinations of Mannheim, Wolff, and Znaniecki. To the general 
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sociological public, however, such preoccupations smack of philosophical 
noology sublimating an inordinate interest in ideology. Such unearned 
disrespect can only be dispelled by a vigorous movement to demonstrate 
the general explanatory value and specific centrality of the sociology 
of knowledge perspective in sociology. Such moves have been begun by 
Adler (1957) and Boskoff (1969). 
It should be noted that a concentration on one knowledge system and 
set of effects does not suggest a rejection of Mannheim's four-factor 
"problem constellation of the sociology of knowledge." As outlined by 
Wolff (1959:576), the essential factors with which the sociology ofknow-
ledge researcher should concern himself are: 
••• (1) the 'self-transcendence' or 'self-relativization 
of thought,' that is, the possibility of not taking thought 
at its face value; (2) 'the emergence of the 'unmasking' 
turn of the mind' (or 'debunking'); (3) ••• the under-
standing of thought as 'the expression of' or 'in relation 
to' history and society; and (4) the social relativization 
of the 'totality' of the 'mental world' not only of ~ 
thoughts. [all puncuation Wolff's] 
Rather, this study may be seen as an adjunct to Part Four, wherein -the 
relativity of values and information is explicated. The definitions of 
the content of "values" are here defined for research purposes. 
Campbell (1964) maintains that a value and an attitude are identi-
cal. Rokeach (1968~454) defined values distinctly as: 
••• a type of belief, centrally located within one's total 
belief system, about how one ought, or ought not, to behave, 
or about some end state of existence worth, or not worth at-
taining. 
Values are pure abstractions, free to be conceptually tied to a circum-
stance or situation, and free to provide what Lovejoy (1950) calls, 
"generalized adjectival and terminal goals." 
The larger issue of thought as a social product, so dear to Marx 
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and Mannheim, is not being skirted. Both viewed the sociology of know-
ledge as the study of "socially conditioned" knowledge. Rather, as a 
premise, it is an unspoken assumption in this as well as most sociologi-
cal research. This research is\in essential agreement with the assump-
tions of the 5iociology of knowledge outlined by Boskoff (1969:309): 
1. Complex societies are composed of empirically different 
roles and statuses that are filled by definable sets of 
persons. 
2~ Each role or status (or social position) entails a set 
of experiences, opportunities, limitations, etc., that 
are more or less accurately perceived by its incumbents. 
3. Over time, many social positions develop interrelated 
cues, norms, attitudes by which members learn to per~ 
ceive in a selective fashion the social behavior of 
persons in other roles and statuses. 
4. Conse·quently, the same events or social processes tend 
to be perceived and evaluated in notably divergent ways 
by persons in different social positions. 
In the writings of Boskoff are found the best balanced analysis of 
the traditional focus of the sociology of knowledge. In it, the effect 
of groups on bodies of knowledge has been the central concern. The 
unique contribution of this research is to reverse the traditional pers-
pec.tive, making for a highly exploratory study. The result is an effort 
to determine if the presence of a known, describable, and specific body 
of knowledge can be said to have measurable effects on the individuals 
using the knowledge. In this case the knowledge system consists of 
examination files. The population is a sampling of fraternity and so-
rarity houses. The change in question is a shift (over.time) in value 
orientations by new members, presumably in the direction of older mem-
bers. 
In essence, the methods of Mannheim, Scheler, and Marx are but one 
way to understand the subject matter. A brief overview of the pertinent 
literature will demonstrate the degree to which the study diverges from 
older approaches. 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The ambiguity of definition in the sociology of knowledge has re-
sulted in a classification problem for related research. Many studies 
unknowingly deal with sociology of knowledge issues and problems. The 
centrality of the subject matter is emphasized by the range and depth of 
the available research. An illustrative sampling of the literature is 
found in this chapter. 
Some ordering is required to systematize the mass of material ex-
amined. Thus, the following classifications will be usedg (1) Knowledge 
and Ideological Systems, (2) Propaganda and Diffusion, (3) Public and 
Political Opinion, (4) Media Format and Effects, and (5) Social and Na-
tional Development. The typical relationship demonstrated is exemplified 
by Boskoff (1969:333): 
The classical statement of .the sociology of knowledge asserted 
a more or less determinate relation (a) between some indicator 
of social position--class, religion, etc.--and a distinctive 
value cluster and (b) between the perspective of focal persons 
or elites and the attitudes of 'dependent' social circles or · 
categories. 
In addition, there is a tendency to view knowledge or its use as an inde-
pendent variable in social settings, and utilize it in such an equation 
that as many iiresults11 can occur as there are dependent variables. 
Knowledge _and Ideological Systems 
Both the "European" and 11American11 branches of the sociology of 
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knowledge (as distinguished by Merton [1957]) have been concerned with 
the theory and research of ideology, using divergent methodologies. The 
"European" school has concentrated on the philosophy and meaning of 
ideology, while the "American" school has _executed two distinct phases. 
The American branch first investigated large-scale knowledge systems 
in terms of the interplay between knowledge production and audience, as 
in Znaniecki's (1940) ~ Social Role of the~ of ~nowledge. Lazars-
feld and Thielen (1958), in The Academic Mind, explored the effect of 
prevailing social thought (McCarthyism) on the social scientist~ Larger 
in scope, Machup's (1962) The Production and Distribution of Knowledge 
assumed a macro-sociological approach to the problem of understanding 
knowledge systems. 
The most recent focus of knowledge research has been the ballooning 
interest in language as the transmission line of culture, especially 
among anthropo logical-li.ngui st s. Lingui sties, as seen by Chomsky (l 957g 
11) one of the pioneers in its anthropological applications, seeks to 
determine, 
the fundamental underlying properties of successful 
grammars. The ultimate outcome of these investigations 
should be a theory of linguistic structure in which the 
descriptive devices utilized in particular grammars are 
presented and studied abstractly, with no specific refer-
ence to particular languages. 
The grammar of language, say the linguists, carries the unspoken but 
understood rules of social organization. Chomsky concludes that studies 
of syntax and semantics are empty, for only grammar is independent of 
meaning (1957:13). Such an inference rests on axioms of the sociology 
of knowledge which are mainly those of Whorf (1956). The link between 
the approaches is obvious, in that both assume knowledge ( seen either as 
fact or language) to be socially derived. 
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The phenomenological implications of the linguistics area are un-
avoidable, for only by interpreting the speaker's language in the context 
of the speaker's conceptual world can a researcher approach verstehen. 
Such an approach, utilized by Goodenough (1956) and Frake (1962), has 
been labeled "componential analysi s. 11 Drawing heavily upon the social 
psychological developments by the "semantic differential" approach of 
Osgood, et al. (1957) applications have attempted to IVbracket" the cul-
tural biases of the researcher. 
The study of language is, however, not the only means of research 
available for studying knowledge systems, as the "Europeann school empha-
sizes. Merton (1957) contrasts the "European" and 11American11 methodol-
ogies. He described the European scholar as pursuing long-range goals of 
philosophical and meta-physical importance. Exemplary were studies such 
as those discussing the social sources of "pragmatism" including Aiken 
(1962), White (1963), and Herman (1943-44). The query of the nEuropean11 
sociology of knowledge as characterized by Merton was, "Why do men think 
as they do?" The answers are largely derived by the methodologies of 
Marx and Mannheim. 
By way of comparison, the American counterpart is more readily con-
cerned with matters of public opinion--what the people think--than the 
mechanisms of social influence. Merton's generalization is broad, but 
largely valid, when he calls the American variant a study of mass be-
liefs and popular culture. Great masses of opinion and attitude studies 
could be cited from books such as Myrdal's (1962) ~American Dilemma to 
articles in Public Opinion Quarterly. Merton suggested that the reason 
for the American penchant for singularly utilitarian research has been 
the military-market place-reform orientation of American Sociology. Like 
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Merton, it is difficult to envision either approach as singly effective. 
The investigation of knowledge (and particularly ideological) sys-
tems has largely been a rhetorical pursuit. Where it has exhibited em-
pirical indicators of significant underlying elements, it has lacked any 
sound theoretical basis allowing for progress by accumulation. Notable 
exceptions have been largely ignored, including the attempt by Topitsch 
(1958} to empirically link ideology in philosophical orientation with 
social circumstances. 
Finally, the study of knowledge and ideological systems has been 
largely in fits and starts, reflecting political and academic trends of 
the past thirty years. 
Propaganda and Diffusion 
The study of propaganda and diffusion has been rooted in the so-
ciology of knowledge, assuming a body of knowledge or information ex-
tant, with presumed effects from exposure. DeFleur writes, "The all 
consuming question ••• in the study of the mass media can be summed up 
in simple terms--namely, 'what has been the effect? 111 (1966: 118). This 
definition creates a natural environment for the study of propaganda. 
Propaganda is an effort to "influence attitudes of large numbers of 
people on controversial issues of relevance to a group" ( see Kris and 
Leites [1951:39]). Many propaganda studies exhibit a ridiculously sim-
ple approach, based on the premise that exposure to or acquaintance with 
some form of information is tantamount to either internationalization 
or conversion. Much of the slowdown in research can be attributed to 
conclusions that the communications media are not as potent as had been 
thought. Developments in social psychology (see Levine and Murphy, 
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1943) have focused attention on such factors as selective perception and 
selective retention as mediators of knowledge internalization, further 
weakening the propaganda researcher's theoretical case. However, propa-
ganda researchers have contributed to the study of knowledge by demon-
strating the profound influence of group norms on individual's perception 
and retention. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1964) offer an excellent review of 
such literature. Klapper (1960) provides a pertinent summary of the ac-
cumulated findings with regard to propaganda and persuasion. 
Although the publication of propaganda research has apparently de-
clined (see Gilbertson [1970:424]) since World War II, the study of dif-
fusion has mushroomed in recent times. By diffusion is meant (Katz, et 
al., 1963:237): 
(l) acceptance, ( 2) over time, ( 3) of some specific item--an 
idea or practice, (4) by individuals, groups or other adopting 
units, linked to (5) specific channels of communication, (6) 
to a specific social structure, and (7) to a given system of 
values, or culture. 
Available to the social scientist is a plethora of diffusion studies in 
many diverse fields. For example, in anthropology, there was the obser-
vation of innovation-diffusion which lead sociologists in this century 
to seek diffusion patterns in American culture (cf. McVoy, 1940 and Pem-
berton, 1936). In marketing, much research has centered on predictive-
diffusion; that is, knowing what will sell where and to whom (cf. Gorman, 
1967). Perhaps the most productive studies have resulted from the com-
bined research of mass communications (cf. Hill and Larsen, 1954; Daniel-
son and Deutchmann, 1960; and Larsen and Medalia, 1958) and political 
behavioral research (cf. Britt and Menefee, 1944 and Denzin and Spitzer, 
1965). Such studies, coupled with those ongoing investigations into the 
adoption of agricultural innovations (cf. Lionberger, 1960 and Sewell, 
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1965) have extended the reach of the social scientist in these areas. 
For a more comprehensive review of related research, use should be made 
of innovation-diffusion studies collected by Rogers (1962). 
Of selective interest is Greenberg's (1964) "Diffusion of News of 
the Kennedy Assassination," wherein knowledge of one specific event was 
analyzed for the rate of diffusion among many social categories of peo-
ple. With regard to the same event, Coleman and Hollander (1965) at-
tempted to measure the effects of the assassination, concluding that it 
produced a revulsion toward violence. While both approaches are note-
worthy, they still miss the goal, for they fail to detect the singular 
effects presumed of a single system of information. This study attempts 
to remedy the absence of investigation in the area. 
Related writings have attempted to examine the mass media as bearers 
of ideological baggage, in the tradition of Mannheim. Exemplary is 
Winick (1959:33) who writesg 
A study of network and station program practices suggests that 
television is a fairly accurate mirror of the more conversative 
values of our society. 
Pertinent also is a body of research intended to identify communi-
cation "networks" which may carry social or intellectual knowledge by 
combinations of physical and mechanical means. Typical are studies of 
"nets" among primitive peoples (see Mead, 1937), the role of leadership 
( see Shaw, 1955), and personal influence ( see Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1964) 
in the network's operation. DeFleur (1962) examined the transmission of 
false information (rumor) over the "nets" while Shaw (1954) studied the 
effects of unequal amounts of information in such knowledge systems. 
In summary, it can be seen that propaganda and diffusion studies 
presume a causal relationship between bodies of knowledge, information, 
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or fact and individuals. Ignorance of the root assumptions of such re-
search leads to a misapplication or disregarding of the findings. The 
sociology of knowledge offers a theoretical framework for the integration 
of propaganda and diffusion research into a general study of social 
thought. 
Public and Political Opinion 
It is interesting that Merton (1957) entitled the sociology of 
knowledge section of his well-known book, 11The Sociology of Knowledge 
and Mass Connnunications" ( see Merton, 1957: 491). It was Merton who 
categorized the American sociology of knowledge as a study in public 
opinion, while Wolff (1959) would later criticize the sociology of know-
ledge as being merely a study in public opinion. One has only to look 
to the literature to see that the study of public opinion is alive and 
well in the United States. Having developed early ( see Lundberg, 1926), 
the term "public opinion" is used as a measure of the mass awareness or 
reactions to information (and not knowledge, ~ ~). Yet the preoccu-
pation with opinions presumes a causal link between information and at-
titude. Sigel (1967) described the creation of political individuals as 
the parallel of normative socialization. The role of knowledge, states 
Sigel, is compatible with that of social values and norms in normative 
socialization. Similar was Levin's (1962) analogy, when he described 
"alienation" as occurring when the mass media's content failed to match 
the perceptions and interests of the audience. 
Few opinion researchers have utilized a sociology of knowledge for-
mat in the operation of research, when such a perspective should prove 
a valuable aid to understanding. Political opinion surveys, for 
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instance, have sought to measure knowledge of information supplied by 
various media. A number of studies, including Erskine (1963) and the 
University of Michigan (1964), have demonstrated that enormous ignorance 
exists among the public with regard to issues and public figures. The 
explanations for these phenomena are inadequatet concluding only that 
some information systems are less important to the public than are more 
immediate and personal systems. One group of researchers, folloWing the 
lead of Lazarsfeld, Herel son, and (;audet (1948) and Merton (1949) has 
pursued the goal of understanding systems of knowledge transrni ssion that 
pivot around community members. Terming these individuals "co smo.po lit ans 
and locals," Merton concluded that the "opinion leader's" assimilation 
of knowledge and resultant conclusions are of significance to individuals 
in their sphere. of influence. Such a perspective has been explored in 
the works of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1964) among others. Stouffer (1963) 
surveyed the main worries of American adults, finding 80 per cent of the 
replies couched in personal terms, suggesting that the public selects 
from specific knowledge systems, information mo st functional to them 
personally. 
The useful framework of the sociology of knowledge and its related 
ideological interests is reflected in its growing applications in po-
litical science. An example is Young ( 1968), !,h! Politics .£!.. Affluence: 
Ideology in .tl!! !-1.!:!!ted _States since World War II, wherein the perceptions 
of Mannheim are used as the guiding theme of the research. Political 
sociologists have been slower to adopt the innovation, continuing usually 
to see political opinion as a function of social structural influence. 
A branch of opinion and attitude research deals with the role of 
cognition in opinion formation. Exemplary of this rather large area is 
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that group of studies evaluating knowledge of danger in a situation rel-
ative to a willingness to take risks. Lanun (1967) studied individual 
risk-taking after knowledge exposure, Wallach and Kogan (1965) studied 
group risk-taking phenomena, and Wallach and Wing (1968) attempted to 
place risk-taking by knowledgeable persons in the realm of values. Such 
studies are valuable first steps toward the understanding of cognition's 
role in knowledge systems. 
Finally, the goal of opinion and attitude research is simply stated 
in sociology of knowledge termsg a body of knowledge or fact is known 
to have been available to a population with presumed measurable effects. 
The movement away from the nomothetic perspectives of early research in 
opinions and attitudes in the direction of a more ideographic sociology 
of knowledge understanding is now occurring along a broad front. 
Mass Media Format and Effects 
The mass media in the United States forms a knowledge system of its 
own, in addition to overlapping into various scientific, social, politi-
cal, and other knowledge realms. It is not surprising to find the study 
of the media a topic prominent in the sociology of knowledge. 
Following World War II it became academically fashionable to study 
the implications of the mass media as a propaganda tool. Vast quanities 
of such research accumulated, resulting in somewhat surprising conclu-
sions. Klapper (1963~517) connnents, 
Mass connnunications research has found few clear-cut yes or 
no answers ••• although it has asserted over and over that 
mass connnunication is rarely, if ever, the prime mover, and 
instead tends to reinforce the existing predispositions 
of its audience members. 
Katz (1966) was more specific, adding, "What research on mass 
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communications has learned in its three decades is that the mass media 
are far less potent than had been expected (1966:551). However, as Mer-
ton (1957) pointed out, American research has tended to lend itself to 
the service of the market place more often than to academic goals. What 
the propaganda researchers may have witnessed is the education of a buy-
ing public. An excellent summarization of the studies of differential 
effectiveness can be found in Hovland (1954), "The Effects of the Mass 
Media of Communication." Yet, Chapman (1971) cautioned that the message 
of the media is often simply an ideology disguised as objectivity, re-
sulting in large-scale negation of the media as a source of fact. No 
thorough studies, he pointed out, have been made on the ideological im-
pact of broadcast media. McLuhan (1964) suggested the radical notion 
that the vital impact of the media is not as knowledge (or ideological) 
dispensations, but as a captivating and personal media. The mode of 
transmission, says McLuhan, is the message of mass communications. A 
British study by Himmelweit, et al. (1958) found children with social 
and academic difficulties using television (just the personal media, not 
the information source) as a barrier against the abrasiveness of social 
interaction. 
Research has tended to concentrate on differential media effective-
ness in terms of media content rather than mode of transmission. The 
internalization of various types of information has been seen to generate 
a broad range of effects. Research in this vein dates from the publica-
tion of Hovland, Janis, and Kelly's Communication and Persuasion (1953), 
wherein basic research in attitude modification was detailed. Elkin 
(1950) sought to determine the effects on children of violence in movie 
westerns. Bailyn (1959) examined the effects of television programming 
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on children's cognitions, Ridder (1963) its effects on academic achieve-
ment, and Foulkes and Katz (1962) on escapist tendencies. Klapper 
(1960) offered a fine survey of the media's mixed effects, while Berko-
witz, et al. (1963) provided an excellent review of research on aggres-
sion and the media. 
A sampling of comparative media effects demonstrates the narrowness 
of conununications research. Belson (1961) treated television, news-
papers, and magazines as rival knowledge-transmission systems. Parker 
(1963) similarly studied television-watching and library circulation 
rates as empirical indicators of knowledge usage. 
An interpretation of media and their alleged effects cannot be 
readily acquired. One reason is that media researchers have failed to 
specify their assumptions as to the significance of the media or the 
impact of the content. In addition many research designs may be flawed 
through the exclusion of intervening variables and multiple causation 
factors. Finally, as Muller (1970) pointed out, to discuss 11massn media 
connotes a predisposition to perceive of society as possessing "massn 
culture, whereas there may be no mass society, only 11mass" ways of con-
ceptualizing society. It is obvious, however, that the advantages of 
perceiving effects and media format research as knowledge system products 
are being ignored. 
Social and National Development 
Increasing amounts of research in the past decade have been directed 
toward nations' transitions from traditional to industrialized societies. 
Many studies conclude that social development depends on nations' pub-
lics acquiring suitable values and attitudes at various status levels. 
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The sociology of knowledge writer has been most concerned with the source 
and transmission means of such acquisition. 
Lerner (1958) examined the broad category of social transitions, 
while other studies have specifically linked political events with the 
public's value-attitudes, including Pye (1962), Apter (1965), Eisenstadt 
(1966), and Lerner and Schramm (1967). Schramm (1964~ 127) stresses that 
much of the responsibility for teaching values and attitudes must go to 
the mass media, saying: 
People who live in societies where the mass media are 
common sometimes forget how much they learn from the 
media. 
Yet the core issue, says Schramm (1964~ ix) is that, "Free and adequate 
information is thus not only a goal; it is also a means of bringing about 
desired social change." Yet Schramm and his fellow mechanics of modern 
industrialization never concern themselves with the central issues of the 
sociology of knowledge ideology, power, and control. Such a point of 
view might have prevented Schramm from naively writing (1964g9Q)~ 
The question ••• is not whether the mass media will ul-
timately come into wide use in the developing countries as 
channels of information and education, but rather whether 
their introduction should be hurried so that they can do 
more than they are doing at present to contribute to na-
tional development. [all emphasis Schramm's] 
Others, however, have commented on the potential effects in developing 
nations of dictatorial control of mass media, among them Pool (1963) and 
Fagan (1964). 
Assuming objective definitions of reality to be a function of indi-
vidual selection from all possible alternatives, the control of knowledge 
sources and access is a topic of prime importance to a society, and 
serves as a central concern of the sociology of knowledge. The applica-
tion of this sociology of knowledge perspective to social and national 
development studies is, as suggested by Boskoff (1969), direct and de-
sirable. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The Methodological Dilemma 
The nature of this study is ess~ntially exploratory. Seeking to 
accomplish multiple ends, descriptive as well as quantitative, the 
methodologies reflect the experimental character of the undertaking. 
This this study bears the sociology of knowledge label presents certain 
difficulties, for as Warner (1952) points out, sociology of knowledge 
writers have, in the past, exhibited a seemingly irrepressible tendency 
to lapse into historicism. The tendency is the product of an honest de-
sire to achieve universally valid generalizations, although it ignores 
many methodological requisites of such endeavors. In short, sociologi-
cal historicism is too far removed from sociological data. Much of the 
blame for the universalist direction of the sociology of knowledge be-
longs to Marx, who concentrated on economic motivations to the exclusion 
of most others, and Mannheim, who concerned himself with political causa-
tion. 
With regard to methodologies in the sociology of knowledge, two 
points of view are becoming increasingly prominent. Sjoberg and Nett 
(1968:5) see a convergence of the neo-idealist and positivist traditions 
in the offing. The neo-idealist tradition grew out of Kantian and 
Hegelian writings, having been elaborated in philosophy by Dilthey and 
in sociology by Weber. The common thread of nee-idealism was the 
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supposition that the data of the physical and of the social sciences were 
irreconcilably distinct. It was in an effort to derive from this view a 
sociological method that Weber (1964) recommended "verstehen" sociology, 
a form of role-taking often under-translated as "understanding." Spe-
cifically, Weber's method was a form of ethnomethodological phenomenology 
wherein the researcher attempted to recreate the constructions of social 
reality perceived by the subject. Bruyn (1964) represents a group of 
sociologists who today eschew all but "verstehen" research methods. 
Others, such as Blumer (1969) still emphasize that the difference in the 
datum must prevent a convergence of methods, for Blumer's insistence on 
an all-pervasive dynamism in society assumes a continuous remaking of 
social reality and the social data. 
By way of contrast, the positivists (from Durkheim through Borgotta) 
and logical empiricists stress, as did Marx, that the methodologies of 
the social and physical sciences are mutually interchangeable. Specifi-
cally, the difference between the two approaches revolves around the 
problem of objectification. The positivist holds that the application 
of the (physical) scientific method results, automatically, in objecti-
fied knowledge that can be integrated into a mechanistic or organistic 
model of social life. Sjoberg and Nett (1968:7), Gouldner (1970)j and 
Friederichs (1970) point out that the positivists have long ignored the 
social impact of their research. An example of this interactiveness be-
tween scientist and data is Bramson's (1961) study which clearly links 
shifts in sociological research orientations to similar shifts in public 
value systems. The greater potential for cause/effects between research-
er and data in one brand of science (the physical as opposed to the so-
cial) is obvious. Yet the situation presents a genuine dilemma, for 
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without some objective knowledge there can be no verified and replicable 
conclusions. Increasingly the sociology of knowledge is being utilized 
as a reference point for understanding sociological data. Sjoberg and 
Nett (1968~11-12) stress this approach when they write: 
Viewed as a methodological tool, the sociology of knowledge 
perspective not only prevents any lapse into antiscientific, 
historicist position but permits one to avoid, at least to 
a degree, becoming a captive of one's own time and place. 
The Problem 
It is curious that little research has concentrated on the social 
effects of a specific body of knowledge, Rather, intense efforts have 
sought to locate the sources of knowledge in social structures. This 
research, by comparison, seeks to ascertain direct effects on individuals 
of a body of knowledge apart from the presumed effects of group member-
ship. 
The regular uses of a body of knowledge will be sampled for their 
reactions to a number of value orientation scales. New users of the sys-
tem will be tested at the time of their initial entrance into the group 
and later after sustained exposure to the knowledge system. The degree 
of use of the knowledge system will be determined and used as a control-
ling variable. An effort will be made to ascertain the degree to which 
the new members are directly affected by the knowledge system through a 
comparison of the shift in reactions to the measuring scales. A shift 
in the direction of those values held by the older members will suggest, 
within limits, some effect of the knowledge system and vice versa. 
Ecological Setting 
The university may be visualized as a multi-faceted complex 
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organization offering participants both goals and means for attainment. 
The manifest functions of the university are held to be the production 
and distribution of knowledge through approved channels--the lecture 
hall, the laboratory, and library. The latent functions of the univer-
sity system are catholic. They include the placement and socialization 
of young adults into social positions, political service, acconnnodation 
of regional technical needs, institutional exchange, and many others. 
Yet always overshadowing the functioning of the university is the know-
ledge storage and dispensation function. As a topic for the sociology 
of knowledge, analysis at this level would be quantitatively impossible, 
for sheer volume would prohibit adequate treatment. However, there 
operates a parallel system of knowledge distribution and consumption 
that is a by-product of the major knowledge generation system of the 
university. The smaller system does operationally short-circuit the ma-
jor function of the university as a whole, for its goal is to supply 
"finished" rather than 11 raw" information. Referred to, of course, is 
the test file system of the fraternities and sororities on campus. The 
symbiotic relationship between the university and rival knowledge sys-
tems is more adequately treated in Chapter V. 
This informal knowledge system is ideally suited for empirical re-
search in the sociology of knowledge for reasons related to theoretical 
and methodological requirements. The smaller knowledge system has: 
(1) limited and knowable sources 
(2) restricted access (being limited principally to members of 
individual fraternities and sororities) 
(3) measurable volume by which the contents of the knowledge sys-
tem can be monitored and analyzed 
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(4) measurable parameters (in that the limits of both sources and 
distribution can be known) 
(5) measurable social effects of the knowledge system due to the 
restricted number of users 
This research should fill a number of theoretical gaps, later specified 
in terms of specification and measurement of knowledge systems. 
The Sample 
The entire Greek population on the Oklahoma State University is dis-
tributed throughout twenty-six fraternities and twelve sororities. Three 
fraternities and two sororities were selected, the five groups constitu-
ting exactly ten per cent of the campus fraternal population. 
The criteria for selection of fraternities consisted of dividing 
the twenty-six fraternities into even categories by size of membership 
(small-medium-large). Sororities were divided into small and large cate-
gories by size of membership. From each group division one fraternal 
organization was selected on the basis of availability access and ade-
quacy of pledge size. 
Within the sample population, a paired-ordering was created, match-
ing every new pledge member with an older member, the older member having 
been in residence at least one year. At the end of three months, the 
pledge group was retested, and the three sets of scores evaluated. The 
total number in the sample was 199, with men and women included. 
The Data 
The data of this research are of three typesg (a) the material or 
artifact data, (b) the non-material data, and (c) the social data. The 
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specification and analysis proceed as follows~ 
The material sources consist of the rather elaborate files kept by 
the Greeks relating to courses, tests, term papers, bibliographies, and 
study guides. This aspect lends itself most readily to description and 
qualitative comparison. Analysis of the material or artifact data at-
tempts to define the parameters of the system in terms of its material 
acquisitions. Since five Greek organizations constitute the sampling 
population, various comparisons are used to determine if the material 
collections differ in size or content. Checks will be made to ascertain 
if file size affects subjects' responses. 
Circourel (1964) maintains that measurement in sociology is essen-
tially a problem in the sociology of knowledge, and further that, no 
single method will suffice. An attempt was made to tailor the various 
techniques of data-gathering to the desired goals of the investigation. 
Thus, the suggestion by Denzin (1970~471-524) was utilized, with regard 
to the use of multiple methodologies, called "data triangulation," in 
order to insure some degree of internal as well as external reliability. 
These triangulation methods include: a selective content analysis of 
information files and other archive data, interview and questionnaire 
administration, and observation. The latter two techniques were used 
with proper consideration that intrinsic and extrinsic test factors can 
influence findings. As suggested by Webb, et al. (1966), the observer-
interviewer conducted all operations under the assumption that the inter-
viewer is a part of the process-level actions, and that in this sense, 
research is necessarily an interactive event. The details of these ap-
plications are described below. 
A. Content Analysis. The existence of a body of systematic and 
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accessible clerical data served to establish certain material parameters 
of the information system. Owing to the sheer bulk of the information 
files maintained by the sample populations, it was necessary to,exercise 
some selectivity, while retaining a consistent sampling procedure for 
comparison. Therefore, a careful quantitative analysis of the frequen~ 
cies, inclusions, exclusions, and depth of the data was performed on the 
materials under the "Sociology" label in the files. By standardizing 
the analysis throughout, it was possible to compare the relative adequa-
cies and inadequancies of the files. Sociology courses are required 
with approximately the same frequency as all other courses on campus. 
Thus, the sampling should have served a standardizing function. Content 
analysis findings appear in Chapter V. 
B. Interview and Questionnaire. All members sampled were required 
to respond to a questionnaire aimed at their dependence on and their as-
sessment of the system's information. A more detailed discussion follows 
under the heading of "The Instrument," and the questionnaire may be seen 
in Appendix A. 
The interviews were conducted with randomly selected members of 
both member and pledge groups of all sample fraternity and sorority 
houses. The aim was a fuller understanding of the information system's 
role in the everyday life and social structures of the participants. As 
the nature of the data was supplemental, not every member of the sample 
was required for interview purposes. The interview schedule may be seen 
in Appendix B. 
C. Observation. The researcher availed himself of opportunities 
granted to observe the operations of the knowledge system. Working with-
out a time table and without interference in the houses' normal routine, 
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a picture emerged with regard to the manner in which the system func-
tioned. Like the interview, observation tended to supply supplemental 
data free from the rigid structuring of the questionnaire format. A de-
scription of the observer's conclusions are contained in Chapter V. 
The Instrument 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts designed to measure 
personal values and ethics in relative terms, as contrasted with the 
effects of the knowledge system. 
The first section of the questionnaire included an original portion 
which, aside from gathering certain attribute data, sought to determine 
specific feelings toward and awareness of the knowledge system. Using 
the names of the respondents, accumulate grade point averages and ACT 
scores were added to the attribute data. 
The second portion incorporated a value-profile designed by Bales 
and Couch (1969) to inventory four value-factors~ acceptance of author-
ity, need-determined expression versus value-determined restraint, 
equlitarianism and individualism. Containing some forty items, the 
Bales and Couch instrument used Likert scaling to weight responses. Ad-
ministered by its inventors to Harvard, Radcliff, and Bennington students 
as well as to officer candidates at Maxwell Air Force Base, factor anal-
ysis by Bales and Couch yielded average inter-item correlations of about 
• 40. 
The third segment of the questionnaire utilized a personal value 
scale from Scott (1965) Values and Organizatiom !_ Study of Fraternities 
and Sororities. Extensively tested at the University of Colorado and 
elsewhere, the short form was here utilized. The short-form contained 
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sixty questions ( from the original 240), and was developed through the 
analysis of the responses of some 900 subjects. Using Cronback's (1951) 
"alpha" as a coefficient of reliability, Scott found most items on the 
short-form (in a test-retest) averaged .65 reliability. 
Operational Procedures 
The administration of questionnaires was standardized insofar as 
circumstances would permit. The bulk of the administrations took place 
in the late afternoon and early evening in the house of residence of the 
fraternity and sorority members. It was generally customary for the 
group to hold meetings after the evening meal. Advantage was taken of 
this habit, and arrangements were made (through the group's vice presi-
dent) to attend. Questionnaires were administered after the meetings. 
Generally the pledges and an equal number of older members were asked to 
remain while the balance of the group departed. Instructions to re-
spondents were very brief, containing a statement that responses would 
not reflect on the member's group or himself (since confidentality was 
assured) and a plea was made for frankness. The time of administration 
ranged from ten to twenty-five minutes, with the bulk of the respondents 
averaging fifteen minutes. The subject's name was elicited at the time 
the questionnaire was returned, and name was used (in cooperation with 
the Office of the Registrar, Oklahoma State University) to obtain the 
following data: cumulative Grade Point Average (GPA) for the Fall, 1971 
semester, and standardized American College Testing (ACT) scores. Strict 
coding procedures were maintained throughout to assure absolute privacy 
for the respondents. 
After the second admini. st ration of the pledge retest questionnaires, 
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interviews were conducted with a random assortment of subjects in an ef-
fort to fill in gaps in the accumulate knowledge. The setting was usual-
ly the lounge or recreation room of the interviewee's house. The time 
was mutually agreed upon to assure privacy. An interview schedule was 
used, and the exchanges were tape recorded. The schedule of the inter-
view's format may be seen in Appendix B. Questionnaire data was coded 
onto computer punch cards for statistical analysis, 
Statistical Analysis 
After the initial coding of the questionnaire data onto punch cards, 
a program was written to transform the raw data into usable form. In 
the program, the Likert scale weightings for each value-factor were sum-
med and a new deck of data cards supplied by computer punching devices. 
The analysis was performed in two stages. First, the primary or direct 
effects of the knowledge system was explored using analysis of variance 
techniques. Second, secondary or indirect effects of both the knowledge 
system and group membership were probed using a proportional comparison 
of means. The means were generated through responses to value-factors 
in Bales and Couch and Scott's scales. 
Using the refined data, another statistical operation was performed. 
Using the ANVAR 23 program from Veldman (1967), three-factor factorial 
analyses of variance were performed. The use of a single blocking ele-
ment, in this case the value-factor, resulted in a split-plot analysis 
of variance with one replication, best conceptualized as two simple two-
way analyses of variance. The formula for this analysis may be found in 
Appendix C. ANVAR 23 was used because of its capacity to treat samples 
of unequal cell size through the use of harmonic means. Factorial 
63 
analysis of variance allowed control of certain variables felt to inter-
vene in the direct operation of the knowledge systems effects. These 
variables included: overall academic competence, as represented by ac-
cumulate Grade Point Averages (GPA), and the American College Testing 
Program Scores (ACT) required for admittance to Oklahoma State Univer-
sity. Other variables controlled were: length of exposure to the know-
ledge system and frequency of use of the knowledge system. Thus, the 
analysis of computer variance program was used to determine if responses 
to value-laden questions _differed significantly enough to warrant further 
investigation of effects. Those value-loadings not attaining a statis-
tically significant variation (o(= <:.05) were passed over. In some 
cases it was necessary to collapse some categories in order that suf-
fic'ient cell size for adequate analysis by ANVAR 23, 
The statistical tests applied to the data sought to determine the 
probability that the various sample groupings were significantly similar 
or divergent as to allow statistical decision on a probability basis 
alone. Thus, the analysis of variance test used the calculated variance 
of each sample to estimate the likelihood that the three samples were 
drawn from different theoretical sampling distributions. Rather than 
using a simple comparison of means, a harmonic means analysis was used 
in order to adequately deal with examples of unequal size. 
The 11 F11 test is modeled on the assumption that comparison of the 
variances of groups will yield a statistical decision at some level of 
significance as to their relatedness. The npn test of significance ac-
counts for differentials in sample size and group variances. While there 
are limitations and drawbacks associated with the use of npn tests, as 
Hsu and Feldt (1969) point out, the exploratory nature of this study 
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suggests that certain latitudes are acceptable in the interests of dis-
covery. The examination of secondary effects was accomplished through 
the compilation and standardization of value-factor means by group (mem-
bers, pledges, and pledge retest). All means were converted to a stan-
dard base of 100 per cent for purposes of comparison. 
Finally, percentages and proportions are used in descriptive por-
tions in order to present a straightforward and simple understanding of 
the knowledge system and its effects. 
CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
The analysis of the findings is accomplished in three parts. I. 
A detailed description of the knowledge system in question and its eco-
logical setting is offered. An attempt is made to demonstrate the role 
of the knowledge system in the functioning of the organization. II. A 
quantitatively descriptive analysis demonstrates the interrelationship 
of the social organization and individuals, and the knowledge system. 
The findings from comparative content analyses of the test files are 
presented, along with the conclusions from interviews and observations 
by the author. III. Finally, the statistical findings with regard to 
shifts in value-clusters as measured among knowledge-users are pre-
sented. 
The Scope and Functioning of the Knowledge System 
There operates on the campus of Oklahoma State University a highly 
efficient and effective means of accumulating functional resource banks~ 
test files. On this campus of about 18,000, the most efficient ma-
chinery operates for the benefit of approximately 1, 000 women and 1., 490 
men who populate the twenty-six fraternities and twelve sororities. 
There is nothing covert or illegal in the accumulation of such files, as 
the later discussion of sources will indicate, nor is their comsumption 
controlled for monetary gain. The existence of the files is common 
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knowledge and not a source of contention on campus. The reasons for the 
files' existence and maintenance must be understood in the context of the 
university as a complex organization. 
The University 
As a large-scale organization, the operation of the modern univer-
sity is in many ways governed by means-ends alternatives. Functioning 
bureaucratically, the university serv·es the needs of society and indi-
viduals in a variety of ways. 
· Reams of sociological sources are extant dealing with the manifest 
and latent functions of the American university, including socialization, 
maintenance of marginality, placement in social stratification systems, 
and many others. Yet overshadowing all of them is the most obvious man-
ifest function, 11 • 0 • described by most as the acquisition and dissem-
ination of knowledge" (see Scott, 1965:75). Even more concrete is the 
training of skilled workers bearing their badge of training, the college 
diploma. The consequence is a situation where the professed or official 
goals are in reality secondary to unofficial or operative goals. Perrow 
(1961:855) says that in such situations some friction is bound to occur. 
Accepting these premises as starting points, i.t becomes easy to accept 
the organizationalist explanation for behavior, frequently being a search 
for goal-attainment and need-satisfaction. Selznick, citing cases where 
the unofficial goals are selected by participants, suggests that II 
the professed goals will tend to go down in defeat" (1943: 48). Thus, 
except for the college degree borne by graduates, the product of the uni-
versity is difficult to see and measure. While Etzioni (1961) points 
out that complex organizations are essentially normative systems, and 
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Thompson and McEwen (1958~24) detail that ideals in terms of behavior or 
goal-achievement become more difficult, 11 ••• as the 'product' of the 
enterprise becomes less tangible and more difficult to measure objec-
tively," both are in terms of process and results. It is for this reason 
that the attainment of a college degree tends to be placed in a position 
of central importance. The means to the degree's attainment is the indi-
vidual acquisition of grade points and credit hours. Discussion of the 
value of scholarly pursuits and academic attachments become largely 
rhetorical, with students being driven to place grades at the top of a 
need-hierarchy. Yet such generalized theorizing may be dangerous with 
regard to knowledge usage. 
Clark (1962) points out that college students, as organizational 
members, comprise sub-cultures he labelsi 11 academic, consumer-
vocational, non-conformist," and 11 collegiate." It is of interest to 
note that only the last, the 11 Collegiate11 sub-culture uses the informa-
tion system extensively. This is for a number of reasons. First, the 
test files are a body of situation-specific resources that are useful 
only in preparing for examinations, and specifically objective examina-
tions. Essay or subjective examinations require a synthesis and degree 
of generalization not obtained by reading prior examination questions. 
Second, the accumulation and maintenance of such files constitute a 
time-consuming and sometimes tedious chore demanding a degree of system-
atization to function properly. The Greek organization can allocate 
manpower to maintain files for the group's benefit without expense or 
difficulty. Third, to be useful the file must contain a range of 
sources covering enough courses to meet group needs. Only from a large 
body of individuals can examinations be produced on a wide number of 
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courses. 
As an organization, the university generally ignores the informal 
knowledge network for a number of sound reasons. Initially, control and 
regulation of such a system would entail more cost and manpower than the 
rewards would justify. Also, the university can readily pretend, in the 
name of pluralism, not to see a large number of occurrences that might 
be generally unpopular. The test file system may, on the other hand, be 
the price the university pays for control. Greek leaders are encouraged 
to work closely with university liaisons, a situation Etzioni (1962~ 112) 
may have been describing when he said~ 
• special efforts are made to encourage formal expressive 
leaders, in order to reduce the dysfunctional effects of 
alienated informal leadership. 
Thus, it may be that the test file system is not ignored so much as it 
is used by the university administration. 
The Knowledge Network 
The specificity of the knowledge-system's content dictates limited 
sources. It is important to examine the test network as it operates in 
the modern university. The item specifically sought is the test ques-
tion, while the package by which they are transmitted is an examination. 
The source of the test item may be a test booklet supplied by text-
book publishers to the instructor. Teachers who use only test booklets 
may be highly sought after by students, for copies of test booklets, 
while not easily obtained by students, are occasionally circulated. 
The instructor may use old copies of his own or other's examinations to 
make up new examinations, in which case the test files may pay off 
handsomely for the student who can recognize questions out of context. 
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The two methods mentioned above tend to operate on behalf of the student 
having access to the test files. Both may be regarded as slack proce-
dures in teaching a course, for they are most frequently utilized by in-
experienced graduate assistants, the faculty member teaching other 
courses he regards as more important, or simply the lazy. Finally, the 
test item may be generated by the instructor by integrating a large body 
of facts, data, nonsense, and course-specific information to create a 
new question. Yet even in this instance the test files may help, for 
past examinations made out by the instructor may reveal to the student a 
pattern or idiosyncracy in test creation. At the very least it yields 
an awareness of the writing style of the instructor. There are limits 
to the number of ways a specific question can be phrased, and this prin-
ciple applies also to test questions. 
The generation of test items and their incorporation into examina-
tions does not exhaust the test networks operation, for it is only be-
ginning at this stage. At many points between instructor and test file 
there is access to the examination by non-faculty personnel. During the 
typing, reproduction, collation, and stapling operations, the examina-
tions are frequently in the hands of work-study students working part-
time. Even in storage, the examination may not be completely secure, 
for the office of the instructor may be breached by the ubiquitous pass 
key. Accidents may occur and the tests may be widely distributed 
through carelessness. In the administration of the examination, the in-
structor or his proctors may hand out extra copies that may ultimately 
be reproduced in photo-copy machines on campus. Finally, the use of 
student graders may bring into play small-scale cheating throuth covert 
channels. 
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Yet all of these mechanisms function when (1) objective examinations 
are used, and (2) not returned by the instructor to the student. A large 
proportion of examinations are in fact, returned to the student after 
being graded. Most examinations find their way into test files in such 
a manner, since the extra effort and risk of stealing examinations may 
only be rewarded if resale is the objective. It has become increasingly 
obvious that the fraternity test file system serves mostly a limited 
audience in rather unexciting ways. 
It is common practice for house members to consult the test files 
when examinations are returned to insure that such a copy is there con-
tained. While it has been rumored that some clandestine activities occur 
in pursuit of complete test files, this appears not to be the case. 
Rather, the needs which generate faculty memos concerning test security 
seem to have been the result of profiteers selling "cold copies" of ex-
aminations to others. The test files are usually housed in a small study 
hall or lounge. Ordering is accomplishing through filing cabinets. Ac-
cess to the files may be obtained freely by housemembers, and in some 
cases their friends. 
Functions of the System 
The functions served by the knowledge system are both individual 
and collective. To individuals the knowledge system meets basic needs 
in the university. For those requiring its benefits, the test files may 
mean the difference between passing or failing a course. It may boost a 
good student's average sufficiently high to insure placement on the 
dean's list. In light of the Greeks' habit of requiring a minimum grade 
point average of its members, the file may determine the maintenance of 
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group membership. 
For the group, the files are physical evidence of the group's 
interest in scholarship (or at least good grades) whether motivated by 
competition or good intentions. Other incentives include the fact that 
membership in the group is contingent upon the maintenance of minimum 
grades. 
The university tends to view the existence of the test files in a 
rather laissez-faire manner. In the years past the practice on some 
campuses was attacked and driven underground. Since, the college com-
munity has tended to simply ignore its existence. Recently, with the 
movements by large numbers of students away from the fraternity member-
ship patterns, active efforts have been made to equalize the effects of 
the files. Some colleges have required instructors to place old copies 
of their examinations on open file in the university library. Other 
colleges ask instructors not to heavily rely on old examinations or en-
courage the use of essay or other non-objective testing procedures. At 
Oklahoma State University, living groups at residence halls have recently 
formed independent students' organizations with the creation of residence 
hall test files as a goal. 
It appears that the university administration has successfully dealt 
with test files through a campaign of silence. Movements by students to 
make colleges less elitest and more egalitarian have been instituted and 
acted upon. Yet the significance to the sociologist lies not in collec-
tive efforts as wave movements. Rather, in the fact that the potency 
and utility of a body of knowledge was recognized and regulated. It ap-
pears that now the body of knowledge contained in test files have been 
successfully diffused. No ill-effects are evident save the loss of 
72 
monopoly by fraternal organizations of which the last is only one symptom 
of a general weakening of influence. 
Content and Access to·t·he Knowledge System 
In analyzing the contents of the examination files, the ordering of 
their selection will be retained. That is, small, medium, and large 
populations among fraternities; and small and large sororities. 
Smallest Fraternity 
A. Setting: Situated upstairs in a two-story fraternity house, 
the files were contained in one steel file cabinet. Only the lower two 
drawers contained files, both were unlocked. Located in a small space 
in a hallway, the files were readily accessible to all members. The 
area also served to house a soft-drink machine and a telephone. No desk 
or chairs were readily available, although the members' rooms were near-
by. 
B. Files~ The files were indexed alphabetically and were contained 
in manila folders. Most of the selections were from basic, required 
courses. Numbering only about thirty-five manila folders, much of the 
space was taken up with contributions in the form of study notes, 
lecture and lab problems, and so forth. 
C. Access~ The files were unlocked ( as stated above) and readily 
accessible to all members of the fraternity. There is no connnittee or-
ganized or appointed to maintain the files. 
D. Contents~ The most prominent single item was a (hand written) 
set of sociological definitions contributed by a former student. Con-
taining some 200 terms and concepts, it could serve students well in 
their preparation for examinations. 
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The file for "Sociology" contained only ten examinations. Of the 
ten, five were listed under course numbering systems no longer utilized 
by the University. These tests were badly out of date. Some examina-
tions were more than five years old, and were prepared by instructors 
long since departed. None were present representing Sociology 1113 
(Principles of Sociology), the most frequented sociology course. Also 
absent were examinations for Sociology 2123 (Social Problems), also a 
popular offering. 
The bulk of the up-to-date examinations seem to have been supplied 
by a single student majoring or minoring in sociology, for most were for 
upper division courses. Only one exam was for a popular undergraduate 
course for non-majors~ Sociology 3423 (Urban Sociology). 
E. Observer's Conclusions~ The files were adequate for the student 
interested in upper division courses and for the student with a narrow 
curriculum. The greatest flaw in the file is its shallowness, a weakness 
accentuated by its being badly out of date. The rather extensive list of 
concepts and definitions was the file's greatest resource. 
Middle Size Fraternity 
A. Setting~ The files are kept in the basement of a rambling fra-
ternity house. Specifically, the files are in two lower cabinet com-
partments of an empty trophy case. Facing the trophy case was a stair-
way leading from the entrance hall to the basement. The basement room 
was approximately ten feet square. A portable television served the 
purpose of recreation room entertainment. No desk or study facilities 
were visible, nor was study possible in the recreation room. 
B. Files: The bulk of the files were contained in two cardboard 
boxes approximately two and one-half feet by two and one-half feet. The 
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exams were filed in manila folders marked with the subject indexes. ThJ 
largest part of the visible files was devoted to speciality courses in 
non-required areas, including zoology, speech, and geography. One box 
was on one side of the case, one on the other. Also, on the right side 
were approximately thirty unlabeled spiral notebooks containing labora-
tory, lecture, and special project notes. None were marked on the out-
side and none were indexed. Next to the spirals was an approximately 
equal number of commercially prepared study guides in various disci-
plines, including English and history among others. No individual or 
committee was charged with the maintenance of the files. 
C. Access: The cabinet containing the files was kept locked at all 
times. A single key was in the possession of a member. No restrictions 
were placed on the length of time or manner of file use, except for the 
difficulty entailed in obtaining the key. 
D. Contents: Two manila folders were inscribed nsociology" in 
the files, each bearing a course number. The two folders, taken to-
gether, contained only three examinations. One undated examination was 
from Sociology 2123 (Social Problems), a popular course. Two examina-
tions were three years old, for Sociology 3353 (Cultural Anthropology). 
No tests were present for introductory sociology, the most heavily en-
rolled course, nor for urban sociology, another frequently taken upper 
division course. 
E. Observer's Conclusionsg The members exhibit rather little con-
cern for the adequacy of the cest files, and as a consequence the test 
files are a poor resource. Stacks of unsorted materials and general dis-
order evidence some degree of neglect. In sociology the files are vir-
tually non-existent. 
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Largest Fraternity 
A. Setting: Kept in two four-drawer file cabinets in a student's 
room, entrance was simple for the room was located just off the main 
hallway. Privacy for the user was generally assured and desks nearby 
could be utilized by the fraternity member. 
B. Files: The first file cabinet contained the bulk of the files. 
The second contained spiral-bound lecture notes, lab manuals, and com-
mercially produced study aids. The course offerings were listed on the 
manila folders. The total number was well over 1200. All were indexed 
alphabetically by course name. 
C. Access: The files were unlocked and there was no hindrance to 
the use of the files by individuals. The door to the room was also un-
locked. 
D. Contents: A seemQngly complete file, the contents were, on in-
spection, heavily weighted in favor of the physical and natural sciences. 
Most majors in the fraternity were pre-medicine and business majors. As 
a consequence, it is not surprising that the bulk of the files were ser-
·vicing students in physics, economics, chemistry, and business. The 
social and behavioral.sciences were virtually ignored, save for a few 
files in psychology. There was, surprisingly, no file in sociology at 
all. 
E. Observer's Conclusions: The files for this group were the best 
tended of all groups surveyed. They exhibited a high degree of organi-
zation and were well indexed. That they were so heavily concentrated in 
the non-social sciences reflects the members' needs, while making analy-
sis difficult. They were, without question, the best files among fra-
ternities. 
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Smallest Sorority 
A. Setting: Situated in the basement of an opulent older home, 
the files consisted of a single metal filing cabinet. The basement file 
area was a multi-purpose one, serving as a storage area for luggage, as 
well as containing numerous vending machines. Two file drawers contained 
manila folders, one contained guides and course notes, the fourth drawer 
was empty. 
B. Files: Indexed alphabetically, the total number of manila 
folders was about 100. While not as orderly as some others (such as the 
largest fraternity, a standard against which the others came to be com-
pared), the file was passably neat. 
C. Access: Located outside heavily circulated areas, the files 
were unlocked and easily used by members. No desk or chairs were readily 
evidenced, thus the user was compelled to remove the file to some other 
work area. 
D. Contents: Two manila folders were inscribed "Sociology. 11 With 
the exception of a few stray examinations from Spanish and Social Stud-
ies, the greatest part of the contents were for Sociology 1113 (Princi-
ples of Sociology). In addition to a class-handout and an obsolete 
course number, six of the eight examinations were four years old and 
from an instructor no longer a member of the faculty. Two examinations 
were recent, one by a current instructor. No examinations for upper di-
vision courses were present. Other folders evidenced heavy emphasis on 
business, chemistry, and math courses. 
· E. Observer's Conclusions: While lacking in some organizational 
qualities, the files were adequate and to some degree current. Quantity 
was not stressed, but apparently those examinations were useful and used. 
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Largest Sorority 
A. Setting: Housed in an opulent multi-storied building, the files 
were stored upstairs, in a closet at one end of a recreation-meeting 
room. Filled to over-flow with odds and ends, the files were contained 
in one steel filing cabinet. The student using the files was able to 
use available tables and chairs as study space so long as the meeting 
room was dormant • 
B. Files: Indexed alphabetically, the manila folders numbered only 
about 150, but were not sub-divided into course names or numbers, only as 
"Sociology," "English," and so forth. Mathematics and chemistry were 
heavily represented. 
C. Access: The files and the meeting room were both unlocked and 
were readily accessible to all members of the organization. 
D. Contents: The file for "Sociology" contained a term paper for 
the introductory course, along· with thirty-four copies of examinations 
badly out-dated, the most recent being at least five years old. There 
were thirteen examinations less than five years old, including two re-
cent final examinations and one very current introductory mid-term. 
Present also was an outline of a textbook chapter on population problems. 
No study guides were present at all. 
E. Observer's Conclusions: The files were badly out of date. Yet 
for the user willing to sift through considerable chaff, there were some 
sources that might be used to advantage. 
Effects of the Knowledge System 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts. The first was an origi-
nal portion posing questions relating to the opinions toward and usage 
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of the knowledge system in question. The second part was a measurement 
of the respondent's value orientations toward a number of coimI1on social 
circumstances. The statistical analysis consists of three parts~ first 
a discussion of the findings of the opinion survey of the sample; then a 
discussion of the findings of the Bales and Couch (1969), and Scott 
(1965) value scales; finally, a number of tangential and secondary ef-
fects are examined. 
Opinion Survey 
The responses on the first portion of the instrument are revealing 
in several ways. Initially the most obvious feature is the patent simi-
larity of responses between older members and pledges, about which more 
will be said later. Explanation of the sample's amazing redundancy be-
tween members and the initial pledge testing can be only conjecture. 
The most likely cause, however, is that: (1) those individual students 
who desire to affiliate themselves with fraternity and sorority living 
groups are of a remarkably like nature at the outset, or (2) the indi-
vidual fraternities and sororities select pledges from among those stu-
dents who are like the members. It is strongly possible that both ex-
planations obtain to some extent, insuring a remarkably homogeneous 
sample. 
The comparison of members' and pledges' responses at the initial 
administration is revealing, while the change in expressed opinions and 
views in the pledges' retest is occasionally striking. Note that some 
sample shrinkage occurred between the first and second administration 
of questionnaires to the pledge classes. 
TABLE I 
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION: "WAS THE PRESENCE OF A TEST FILE 
GIVEN AS A REASON THAT YOU SHOULD JOIN YOUR FRATERNITY 
OR SORORITY?" 
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Members Pledges Pledge Retest 
Response (%) (No.) (%) (No.) (%) (No.) 
Yes 34.0 ( 23) 34.0 ( 23) 21.0 (14) 
No 60.0 (40) 63.0 (42) 74.0 (48) 
Don't Remember 6.0 ill 3.0 ill s.o .ill 
100.0 ( 67) 100.0 ( 67) 100.0 (65) 
As Table I indicates, exactly 34% of both Members and Pledges re-
plied affinnatively to the question of the test file's role in inducing 
them to join the organization. Yet, by the time of the Pledge Retest 
administration only 21% could remember such reasons having been given. 
At the first testing, an almost identical proportion indicated that no 
such inducements had occurred (60% and 63%, respectively). With the 
passage of time the Pledge Retest group responded (74% strong) that no 
such reasons had been advanced for them to join. Individuals in all 
groups who failed to recall any such discussions fluxuated from 310 to 
6%. 
The interpretation of the responses suggest that two things may 
have occurred. First, with attention having been brought to the know-
ledge system by the administration of the questionnaires, the subject's 
memory may have been clouded regarding the matter. Second, a retouching 
of the mental image of rush activities may have occurred. 
Response 
Never 
Once A Semester 
Several Times A 
Semester 
Every Few Weeks 
TABLE II 
RESP ON SE TO THE QUESTION: "HOW OFTEN DO YOU 
USE THE TEST FILES? 11 
Members Pledges Pledge 
(io) (No.) (%) (No.) (io) 
17 .o ( 11) 29.0 (19) 20.0 
24.0 ( 16) 15.0 (10) 33. 0 
46.0 (31) 43.0 ( 29) 43.0 
13.0 _i.22. 13.0 _i.22. 4.0 
100.0 ( 67) 100.0 ( 67) 100.0 
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Retest 
(No.) 
( 13) 
( 22) 
( 28) 
_ill 
( 65) 
An examination of Table II reveals a somewhat mixed series of opin-
ion responses. With the exception of the "Several Times A Semester" 
category, there appears to exist little consistency anywhere in the sam-
ple. Yet a more detailed study suggests that in the categories "Never" 
and "Once A Semester" there is a perceptible drift among Pledges in the 
direction of the expressed opinions of the Members. It is curious that 
the percentage of frequent users among pledges declined to 4% by the 
time of the Pledge Retesting. Significantly, the largest and most con-
sistent concentration appears in the individuals in all groups who make 
use of the knowledge system "Several Times A Semester. 11 
TABLE III 
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION, "HAVE YOU EVER FELT THAT THERE 
WAS ANYTHING WRONG (OR IMMORAL) ABOUT USING 
THE TEST. FILES? 11 
Members Pledges Pledge 
Response (%) (No.) (%) (No.) (';1a) 
Yes, Often 1.0 (1) o.o (0) o.o 
Yes, Occasionally 5.0 ( 3) 6.0 (4) 8.0 
No, Or Never Con-
sidered It 94.0 ( 63) 94.0 ( 63) 92. 0 
100.0 ( 67) 100.0 ( 67) 100.0 
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Retest 
(No.) 
(0) 
(5) 
(60) 
( 65) 
The responses to the question presented in Table III again demon-
strate a remarkable similarity among the three samples. Between Members 
and the first Pledge testing responses varied only 2% overall. Notice-
able also is the fact that exactly 94"/o of both Members and Pledges 
either had never considered or felt guilt in the usage of the test 
files. Only minimal changes (in light of sample size) had taken place 
by the Pledge Retest administration. The impact of this topic may have 
been diminished by the recent development of test files in the unaffili-
ated student residence halls. 
TABLE IV 
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION: "DO YOU FEEL THAT ALL INSTRUCTORS SHOULD 
BE REQUIRED TO PLACE OLD TESTS ON FILE IN THE LIBRARY SO 
THAT ANYONE COULD SEE THEM BY SIMPLY 
CHECKING THEM OUT?" 
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Member-s Pledges Pledge Retest 
Response (%) (No.) (to) (No.) (%) (No.) 
Yes 48.0 (32) 51.0 (34) 46.0 (30) 
No 24.0 (16) 25.0 (17) 19.0 (12) 
No Opinion 28.0 (19) 24.0 (16) 35.0 ( 23) 
100.0 ( 67) 100.0 ( 67) 100.0 (65) 
Responses to the suggestion that instructors be required to place 
examinations on file for the general student body were received with 
mixed reactions. For members, almost half (48%) responded affirmatively 
while one-fourth (24%) answered negatively. The initial responses of 
the Pledges was one of almost exact agreement with an average of only 3% 
variation in each category of answers. The Pledge Retest revealed, how-
ever, that a small drift toward ambivalence had occurred. That is, the 
percentage of agreement among Pledges had slipped from 51% to 46% (to a 
point lower than Members), while the percentage of disagreement among 
Pledges had fallen, from 25io to 19%. Those Pledges expressing no opinion 
increased by 11% from first to second testing. The reasons for such a 
shift may be many, the most obvious being a possible disillusionment 
with the test file system in which its promosed effects were over-
represented. 
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TABLE V 
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION, "DO THE TEST FILES HELP?" 
Members Pledges Pledge Retest 
Response (%) (No.) (io) (No.) (%) (No.) 
Yes 76.0 (51) 60.0 (40) 60.0 (39) 
No 7.0 ( 5) 3.0 ( 2) 12.0 (8) 
Can't Tell 17.0 (11) 37.0 ( 25) 28.0 (18) 
---
100.0 ( 67) 100.0 ( 67) 100.0 (65) 
Table V displays the responses from the query, "Do the test files 
help?" Among Members, fully three-fourths replied that the test files 
were helpful (76%). Only 7% of the Members replied negatively, while 
some 17% indicated that they were unable to distinguish any effects. 
The first Pledge testing revealed that a smaller percentage (60%) than 
Members saw the test files as helpful and only 3% saw no value in their 
use. More than one-third (37%) said that the effects were not definable. 
By the occasion of the readministration of Pledge questionnaires, those 
finding no help in the utilization of the files had quadrupled (from 3% 
to 12%). The additional individuals in the negative category came from 
those previously replying "can't tell'' ( from 37io to 28%). Pledges having 
found the test files of some use remained constant at 60%. 
One trend is clear from Table V. The longer a respondent was ex-
posed to the test files, the more clear-cut were the effects. Note that 
among older Members the "can't tell" category contained only 17% and 
that Pledge percentages by Pledge Retest were changing in the Members' 
direction. 
TABLE VI 
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION: "HOW RELIABLE IS THE 
INFORMATION IN THE FILES?" 
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Members Pledges Pledge Retest 
Response (%) (No.) (%) (No.) (,.) (No.) 
Excellent 13.0 (9) 12.0 (8) 14.0 (9) 
Alright 66.0 (44) 52.0 (35) 49.0 (32) 
Fair 13.0 (9) 9.0 (6) 21.0 (14) 
Poor 5.0 (3) 6.0 (4) 5.0 (3) 
No Opinion 3.0 
..in.. 21.0 (14) 11.0 _ill 
100.0 ( 67) 100.0 ( 67) 100.0 (65) 
In response to a question probing the reliability of information in 
the test files, an interesting trend was suggested. Among all three 
groups of respondents the percentage agreeing that the files' reliability 
was "excellent" was nearly identical, (13,., 12,., and 14,., respectively). 
The categories "alright" and "fair" appear singularly meaningless until 
combined, wherein 79% of the members so replied, contrasted with 61% of 
the Pledges, and 70% at the Pledge Retesting. There had been a dis-
cernable shift in the direction of the opinions held by the Members. 
All responses to the "poor" category ranged only from 5% to 6i •• 
As in Table V, there was a tendency for Pledges to reduce their ex-
pressed ambivalence from initial to second testing (from 21% to 11%). 
Thus, in Tables V and VI the passage of time had a similar effect on 
Pledges in that there was a parallel tendency. The tendency was toward 
the diminution of ambiguity of opinion, with a movement in the direction 
of the levels of expressed ambiguity of Members. 
TABLE VII 
RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION: "WHEN ANOTHER FRATERNITY OR SORORITY 
MEMBER ASKS IF AN ELECTIVE COURSE IS A GOOD ONE, DOES 
HE MEAN AN EASY ONE OR AN EFFECTIVE COURSE?" 
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Members Pledges Pledge Retest 
Response (%) (No.) (%) (No.) (%) (No.) 
Usually Easy 46.0 (31) 61.0 (41) 49.0 (32) 
Usually Effective 54.0 (36} 39.0 ( 26} 51~0 (33) 
100.0 ( 67) 100.0 ( 67) 100.0 (65) 
The question motivating Table VII was used to determine if the 
ideals of the Pledges tended to be altered in the face of experience. 
Pledges and Members were asked if a recommended course's desirability 
was based on its content and requirement simplicity or on effectiveness. 
That most new pledges had not asked nor been asked the question was in-
dicated by the broad disparity in responses in Table VII between the 
Members and Pledges, the variation averaging 15%. Yet by the time re-
testing had occurred the variation between Members and Pledge Retest 
sampling responses was a mere 3%. Obviously some opinional trarisfonna-
tions had occurred,' brought about, apparently, by a readjustment of 
Pledges I preconceptions. While new Pledges expected Members to be nearly 
twice as likely to want easy as opposed to effective course, they dis-
covered, in point of fact, that group Members are about as likely to 
prefer an effective course as an easy course. 
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Primary Effects 
The Bales and Couch Scale 
The second portion of the research instrument consisted of a value-
profile scale designed by Bales and Couch (1969). The scale measured 
four value-factors. These value-factors were (1) acceptance of author-
ity, (2) need-determined versus value-determined restraint, (3) equali-
tarianism, and (4) individualism. Constructed of Likert scalings, forty 
items were used from the original 240. Within the expectations of this 
study, the hypothetical effects of the knowledge system would be visible 
in value orientations of Pledges. Such value orientations would be an-
ticipated to gravitate from a differential position to one similar to 
those held by Members. 
In the initial analysis of the data a three-factor factorial was 
used to control (or to separate out the effects of) Grade Point Average 
(G.P.A.), group membership, and frequency of usage of the knowledge sys-
tern. The findings of this analysis are presented in the following 
tables. All significance levels indicated are at co(.= .05. 
TABLE VIII 
BALES AND COUCH VALUE-PROFILE CONTROLLING FOR G.P .A., GROUP 
MEMBERSHIP, AND KNOWLEDGE-SYSTEM USAGE 
Frequency 
G.,P ~A. Group Membership of usage 
Acceptance of Authority N.B." N. S. N.·s.· 
Need-Determined Vs. 
Value-Determined Expression N.S. N. S. N;s.' 
Equalitariani sm N.'s; N.'S.' SIG.' 
I ndi viduali sm N.·s; N. s. N .·s. 
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The examination of Table VIII demonstrates that only one of the 
four Bales and Couch value-factors--"equalitarianism"--was found to ex-
hibit a statistical significance. The removal of the effects of A.'c.t. 
scores was seen to strongly effect the analysis. 
In the second analysis of the Bales and Couch scale, two changes 
were made. First, A.C.T. test scores were added as an independent var-
iable for analysis while G.P.A. scores were dropped. Second, the cate-
gories of frequency of usage of knowledge system were collapsed from 
four to two (representing "heavy" and "light" usage) in order that ade-
quate cell sizes be maintained insofar as possible. The same four value 
factors were retained. 
TABLE IX 
BALES AND COUCH VALUE-PROFILE SCALE CONTROLLING A.'C.T.' SCORES, 
GROUP MEMBERSHIP, AND KNOWLEDGE-SYSTEM USAGE 
Frequency 
A.C.T. Group Membership of usage 
Acceptance of Authority N. s. N. S. N.S. 
Need-Detennined Vs. 
Value-Detennined Expression N. S. N. S. N .;s. 
Equalitarianism N. S.' N.'S,' N.'s.' 
Individualism N.S. N. s. N.'s. 
In Table IX it may be seen that in removing the presumed effects of 
the qualities represented by A.C.T. scores, none of the three dependent 
variables were found to exhibit statistical significance. No loading on 
any of the value-factors was in evidence. 
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Scott Value Scale 
Pa.rt II of the research instrument was comprised of a value-profile 
scale by Scott (1965). The theoretical orientations presented earlier 
suggest that a significant variation might be anticipated between the 
older Members and the Pledges at Retest. Excluding the effects of A.C.T. 
and G~P.A.' scores, both presumed to be potentially influential variables. 
The first set of analyses of variance using the Scott Value Scale 
used a three-factor factorial to simulaneously control for three effects. 
The following table details the findings. 
TABLE X 
SCOTT VALUE SCALE CONTROLLING FOR C:.P .A.', GROUP 
MEMBERSHIP, AND KNOWLEDGE-SYSTEM USAGE 
G.PoA. Group Membership 
Intellectualism No S. N.·s. 
Social Skills N. S. N.S. 
Loyalty N. s. N.S. 
Academic Achievement N. S. N. S. 
Status N. S. N.'S. 
Honesty N.S. N.·s; 
Religiousness N. S. SIG. 
Self-control N.S. N. S. 
Independence SIG. N. S. 
Frequency 
of usage 
N .·s. 
N. S. 
N. S. 
N."S. 
N.·s; 
SIG. 
N.·s. ' 
SIG. 
N .·s. 
A discussion of Table Xis revealing if for no other reason than it 
displays a remarkable absence of statistically significant findings. 
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That there should be only one value-factor exhibiting a F-value of sig~ 
nificance--on 11 independence11 --is not particularly surprising. 
By the same token, an examination of the relative effects of group 
membership yields the finding that neither "social skills" nor "status" 
seem to weigh most heavily. Rather, "religiousness" exhibits statistical 
significance. 
In light of the theoretical grounding of this study, the strongest 
and mo st meaningful findings might be anticipated under the category of 
frequency of usage (of the knowledge system), assuming a valid knowledge 
system. Two value-loadings from among others is not readily discernable, 
but will be later discussed. 
As Table XI clearly demonstrates, whatever the effects presumed to 
be seen in Table X were removed by the substitution of A.C. Ts for G.'P.A. 
as a controlling variable. Just as when A.C.T. was used as a control on 
Bales and Couch scaling items, all statistical effects were eliminated. 
It is obvious that whatever its other uses, A.C.T. scores are apparently 
a useful control of random effects in analysis of variance. 
TABLE XI 
SCOTT VALUE SCALE CONTROLLING FOR A. C. T., GROUP 
MEMBERSHIP, AND KNOWLEDGE-SYSTEM USAGE 
A.Co To G:r;-oup Membership 
Intellectualism N. S.,1 N. S. 
Social Skills N. S. N.S. 
Loyalty N. S. N. S. 
Academic Achievement N. S. N. S. 
Status N.S. N. S. 
Honesty N. S. N. S. 
Religiousness N. S. N. S. 
Self-control N. S. N. S. 
Independence N. S. N.S. 
Frequency 
of usage 
N.,s. 
NaS.' 
N. S. 
N. S. 
N. S. 
N. S. 
N. S. 
N.S. 
N. S. 
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Summary of Primary Effects 
The Bales and Couch scales were found to demonstrate some measurable 
knowledge-system effects. With G.P.A. controlled, only one value-factor 
was seen to be affected in a removal of all measurable effects. Thus, 
in the Bales and Couch value scale, one value-factor from among a poten-
tial twenty-four was found to be affected by dependent variables. 
In the Scott scale, the control of G.P.A. resulted in the finding 
.that one value-factor ("independence") was seen to be influential by 
grades. One value"."factor ("re;ligiousness") was influential by group 
membership. Two value-factors ("honesty" and "self-control") were seen 
to be affected by the frequency of knowledge-system usage. With the 
substitution of A.C.T. scores as a controlling variable, all statistical 
significance was eliminated. Only a small percentage of possible effects 
were seen to occur. There were changes in only four out of a possible 
fifty value-factors and dependent variables. 
Secondary Effects 
As the preceding section suggests, there was limited evidence of 
anticipated direct effects of the fraternity knowledge system. Given, 
however, that this study was conceptualized as exploratory, a great deal 
of additional data was generated. "Secondary Effects" reports the anal-
ysis of data meeting tangential goals, for alternate routes were deemed 
acceptable in the determinations of change in the respondent groups over 
time. 
Using the means for groups M, PI, and Pll (Members, Pledges, and 
Pledge Retest) produced by ANVAR 23, comparisons were made using the 
three groups. The initial comparison in Table XII presents the group 
means for Bales and Couch Value Profile Scale. 
TABLE XII 
MEANS FOR BALES AND COUCH VALUE PROFILE SCALE BY GROUP MEMBER-
SHIP CONVERTED TO STANDARD BASE (100) 
M PI PII 
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(Members) (Pledges) (Pledge Retest) 
Acceptance of Authority 61.28 60.65 58.38 
Need-Determined Vs. 
Value-Determined Expression 57.93 59.86 61.45 
Equali tariani sm 55.25 56.01 53.25 
Individualism 63.35 60. 76 61.08 
To the first two sets of means, for •lacceptance of authority, 11 and 
lfneed,-determined vs. value-determined expression, 11 little can be added 
or deduced. The Mand PI scores are so similar that either a repetition 
of scores or a differentiation of means was inevitable by PI! testing. 
However, in the means of the latter two value-factors--"equalitarianism" 
and "individualism11 --two meaningful trends are suggested. 
First, there is a definite tendency for PII means to demonstrate a 
numerical movement in the direction of the mean positions of members. 
Examples in the Bales and Couch Scale are 11 equalitarianism" and 11 indi-
vidualism. 11 The drift is seen to have occurred in the interim between 
PI and PI! testing, a period of some three months. 
Second, among those value-factors where means tend to change in the 
direction of Members' means, a number of them tend also to demonstrate 
another tendency. As illustrated by "equalitarianism," the PI! mean not 
only changes its direction to parallel the M mean, but, indeed, the PI! 
mean exceeds that of the Members. One example suffices in the Bales and 
Couch Scale, while more are presented in the Scott Value Factor Scale 
that follows. 
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The value-factor mean for the "Accept~mce of Authority" factor 
suggests in older members a stronger appreciation for the use of author-
ity in group settings. By the same token, there is demonstrated among 
Pledges a steadily diminishing "acceptance of authority" appreciation. 
In a demonstration of consistency, the value-factor "need-determined 
vs. value-.determined expressions" suggests that there is in Members a 
tendency to perceive a need for individual conduct in accordance with 
genuine value-orientations as opposed to the exigencies of immediate 
need. PI and PII means show an increasing appreciation for a situation 
specific expression based on momentary needs. In both ".accept'ance of 
authority" and "need-determined vs. value-determined expression" means, 
there is an obvious value-conflict between Members and Pledges with re-
gard to the two value-factors. 
A visual examination of Table XIII reveals that both trends sug-
gested in the Bales and Couch Value Profile (Table XII) are more repre-
sented in the means of the Scott Scale. Of the total of nine value-
factors in the scale, fully eight (excluding "independence") manifest 
evidence of the first tendency. That is, in 88% of the value-factor 
means, there was a tendency for PI means to shift by the PII testing in 
the direction of expressed values of Members. Importantly, three of 
the eight value-factors also validated the second trend. "Intellectual-
ism," "honesty," and "self-control11 loadings tended to change so dra-
matically that by PII testing expressed values among Pledges became 
stronger than those of Members. There was also an unusual shifting of 
the relative ordering among the value-factors. Table XIV presents the 
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relative rank orderings of value-factors for the Scott scale only, and 
depicts some rather interesting over-time changes in relative rankings. 
TABLE XIII 
MEANS FOR SCOTT VALUE SCALE BY GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
CONVERTED TO STANDARD BASE ( 100) 
M PI PII 
(Members) (Pledges) (Pledge Retest) 
Intellectualism 51.50 so.so 53.16 
Social Skills 58.91 56.83 58.83 
Loyalty 53.44 52.33 52. 77 
Achievement 47 .83 48.08 47.91 
Status 45. 77 44.44 45.33 
Honesty 37.33 38.33 35.66 
Religion 41.33 48.73 47.40 
Self-control 47.66 49. 83 46.83 
Independence 33.44 33.88 38.48 
TABLE XIV 
RELATIVE RANKINGS OF VALUE-FACTORS IN SCOTT VALUE 
SCALE BY STRENGTH OF RESPONSE* 
M PI 
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PII 
(Members) (Pledges) (Pledge Retest) 
Intellectualism 
'->\t,3 3 2 
Social Skills 1 1 1 
Loyalty 2 2 3 
Achievement 4 6 4 
Status 6 7 7 
Honesty 8 8 9 
Religion 7 5 5 
Self-control 5 4 6 
Independence 9 9 8 
*Scale represented is ordinal. 
There was a tendency for Members to most highly regard "social 
skills," ''loyalty," and 11 ihtellectualism" in that order. Members tended 
to least favor ''independence, 11 "honesty," and 11 religion, 11 respectively. 
On the occasion of the initial Pledge testing the most favored 
value items appeared to be "social 'kills," "loyalty," and ''intellect-
ualism," while ' 1 status, 11 nhonesty," and "independence" were the least 
favored value factors. 
By the time of the Pledge Retest, "social skills," "intellectual-
ism," and "loyalty" were mo st highly ordered. Least acceptable were 
"status," "independence, 11 and "honesty." 
Generalizations regarding Tables XII, XIII, and XIV may be tenuous, 
·. 
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but the following appears to be suggested. First, there is a tendency 
for Pledges, already remarkably similar in background, orientation, and 
associations, to manifest values increasingly parallel to those of older 
Members. Second, another trend suggests that there exists a degree of 
super-identification with collective values by Pledges. Such an over-
compensation by Pledges has been alluded to in the research of a number 
of group studies normally identified with social psychology. For ex-
ample, Newcomb (1943) found that Bennington College girls from politi-
cally conservative homes tended to reverse their political attitudes 
under group pressure at college. Further, Newcomb found that there was 
a marked tendency for Bennington girls to politically overcompensate. 
The most conservative freslnnen girls were frequently the most liberal 
seniors. Newcomb (1963) concluded that the changes he observed twenty 
years earlier were more or less permanent. Third, there appears to be 
patternings to the rankings of value-factors as seen in Table XIVo' These 
patterns suggest that the personal attrHu1te "social skills" is consis-
tently and supremely valued by Members and Pledges alike. Among members 
of organizations which stress the social and inter-active arts, such 
findings should not be surprising. Also very highly regarded values to 
possess include "loyalty," and uintellectuali sm, 11 the former being a 
personality trait particularly nurtured by fraternities and sororities. 
The second may be the product of new and sweeping non-fraternal movements 
on many campuses. Interesting, also, are the value-factors receiving 
the least relative favor. In a highly integrated in-group situation, the 
value of personal nindependence" may be questionable where it tends to 
prove disruptive. The mean rankings tend to support this view. Curious 
and inexplicable is the low relative weighting attached to 17honesty." 
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Finally, the comparison of group-related means for Bales and 
Couch's and Scott's scales revealed subtle and suggestive findings. As-
suming the validity of the instruments and their grounding assumptions, 
I 
a number of pertjnent questions have been raised for further research. 
) 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Sununary of the Findings 
The sununary of the findings is divided into two sections. The 
first part, "Statistical Significance," treats the findings in the tra-
ditional manner of statistically significant at the .05 level will be 
discussed. Next, in a section entitled 11 Substantitive Significance," 
thbse effects not able to be interpreted nor detectable through 
hypothesis-testing methods will be examined. 
Statistical Significance 
The findings are here sununarized by primary and then by secondary 
effects. 
The use of the Bales and Couch Value Profile to distinguish value 
change over time was not particularly successful. In controlling for 
primary effects, the factorial analysis of variance was unable to detect 
any measurable differences when A.C.T. scores were included. Only one 
value-factor, "equalitarianism," was statistically significant when 
G_.P,.'A. was included. 
The use of Scott's Value Scale was marked with somewhat more suc-
cess. When the effects of G.P.A. were removed, two value-factors were 
significantly affected by frequency of usage, these being 11 honesty11 and 
llself.control. 11 One value-factor was seemingly affected by group 
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membership (''religiousness"), and one value-factor by G. P.A. levels 
("independence"). The substitution of A.C.T. scores for G.P.A. as a 
controlling variable removed all effects of all three independent vari-
'•; 
ables upon the value-factors as measured by statistical significance. 
The secondary effects were more strongly demonstrated and clearly 
defined. For example, the use of the Bales and Couch scale means by 
group membership revealed that a trend was present. There was a marked 
tendency for two of the four Bales and Couch value-loadings ( 11 equalitar-
ianism" and "indiv-idualism") to show Plepges' means changing in the di-
rection of Members' mean scores. The first of those two also demon-
strated another trend, where the Pledge Retest score was seen to exceed 
the Members' mean score. 
The trend established in the Bales and Couch scale was strongly 
echoed in the Scott Value Scale, when fully eight of nine value factors 
were found to change at Pledge Retesting in the direction of Members' 
means. The validation of the second trend was accomplished when three 
of the eight value-factors (including "intellectualism," 11 honesty," and 
"self-control") also exhibited stronger PII means than Member means. 
Finally, then, the findings of the primary and secondary effects of 
the Bales and Couch scale were of little impact when G.-P.A. was used as 
a controlling variable, of no measurable impact when A.C.T. was substi-
tuted for G.P.A. Secondary effects as seen in the Bales and Couch scale 
were the most obvious and telling of all contrasts. Comparing Pledges' 
means for nine value-factors, fully eight demonstrated tendency of di-
rect ional movement toward parity with Members' means. 
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Substantitive Significance 
Controversies over significance tests often center on the assump-
tion that the probability of/i-errors (the likelihood of accepting a 
false null hypothesis) should be minimized in all ,research. Yet much 
exploratory research could benefit from the acceptance of a reduced 
level such that the probability of,.<9-error is increased, while the op-
portunities of discovery concomitantly rise. That is, an alternative 
point of view which could lead to different conclusions, particularly 
in fairly homogeneous populations, is to begin the testing process by 
assuming the existence of slight differences, rather than no differ-
ences. The use of such a perspective is responsible for the discussion 
that follows. 
The reason for setting~ at .05 was to filter out a number of dis-
cernable effects among the variables under examination. It also made a 
number of interactive effects between the same categories possibly less 
obvious. 
Viewing them, however, in a less stringent light, some measurable 
variances were seen to exist. For instance, in Table IX, entitled, 
"Bales and Couch Value-Profile Scale Controlling A.C.T. Scores, Group 
Membership, and Knowledge-System Usage," the loadings on two value-
factors were numerically high, but failed to achieve statistical sig-
nificance. These were "need-determined versus value-determined ekpres-
sion" on frequency of usage, and "equalitarianism" on group membership. 
In addition, on Bales and Couch value-factors in the scale, all except 
"acceptance of authority" demonstrated a tendency to show high interac-
tions between A.C.T. scores and frequency of usage, suggesting that the 
effects are not completely independent. 
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Viewing Table X, "Scott Value Scale Controlling for G.P .A., Group 
Membership and Knowledge-System Usage," a number of factor loadings were 
again very high but not statistically significant. Among these were the 
following: "academic achievement" relating to frequency of usage, "hon-
esty" relating to G.P .A., "religiousness" relating to frequency of usage, 
and "independence" relating to both "group membership" and "frequency of 
usage." The last loadings, however, were offset by the fact that there 
• 
were inter~ctive effects between G.P.A. and both group membership and 
frequency of usage. 
Table XI, entitled "Scott Value Scale Controlling for A.C.T., Group 
Membership, and Knowledge-System Usage" found two numerically high load-
ings not statistically :significant at .05. On the value-factor "social 
skills," both A.C.T. and frequency of usage were noticeably high. In 
addition, there was evidence that A.C.T. score effects were not complete-
ly independent of group membership and frequency of usage with regard to 
the value-factor "intellectualism." Group membership and frequency of 
usage also appeared to be interactive with respect to the value-factor 
"loyalty." 
Finally, using levels of less than .05, only nine more value factors 
(out of fifty possible) were added, with the evidence of interactive ef-
fects eliminating the clear-cut nature of many of the findings. Thus, 
only thirteen factors out of fifty could be said to have exhibited 
measurable effects using either criteria for decision-making. The ob-
vious conclusion is that the sociological effects of the knowledge sys-
tern in question are minimal, as measured by the value orientations on 
the Bales and Couch and Scott Value scales. 
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Conclusions 
The utilization of analysis of variance as a statistical tool for 
the interpretation of the data may have been unfortunate. The reason is 
that analysis of variance is best suited to the detection of great dif-
ferences in heterogeneous populations. While college students as a 
group form a rather homogeneous aggregation, those students engaged in 
fraternity and sorority activities appear to be infinitely more alike 
than even the balance of the student body. Given these circumstances, 
analysis of variance may have been somewhat insensitive to the smaller 
variations in the sample. 
Nevertheless, two major conclusions may be drawn from the findings. 
First, the primary effects of the knowledge system were few, and those 
appearing point to one startling suggestion--the test files (as a know-
ledge system) are largely a myth. This conclusion is reinforced by view-
ing Table X, where an otherwise inexplicable value-factor (' 1 indepen-
dence") was strongly linked to G.P.A., while the frequency of usage was 
repeatedly demonstrated to have little or no effect on value factors 
even when less stringent levels were used. Further, the substitution of 
A.C.T. for G.P.A. scores in Table XI resulted in the total negation of 
statistically significant effects. Thus, a measure reflecting individual 
ability successfully destroyed the few remaining effects of the knowledge 
system. 
That the mythical nature of the files (as a knowledge system) is 
particularly salient is shown by the strongly expressed beliefs by mem-
bers in the system's potency (Table V), reliability (Table VI) and neces-
sity of restriction (Table IV). The impl~cations of such a finding are 
profound and can only be hinted at in the "Suggestions for Further 
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Research." Yet the direct impact is to lead observers to question other 
knowledge systems' potency, regardless of their presumed and possibly 
mythical effects. 
Next, the tendency suggested in Chapter V of new members to ex-
perience a period of over-identification with group norms is complimen-
tary to the conclusion that the effects of test files are mythical. 
That is, if the new member undergoes a period of resocialization by the 
group, he will be expected to accept collective beliefs, among them the 
potency of the knowledge system here examined. That new members more 
strongly accept the myth the longer they are members is understood in 
light of the fact that "social skills" and "loyalty" were the value-
factors (Table XIV) consistently selected by all groups as most desir-
able. Individual acceptance of the myth may mean that personal exper-
ience to the contrary is dismissed and the myth reinforced, whenever 
consistent with fact. 
The leadership of these organizations may utilize and perpetuate 
the myth because (1) they do not know it is a myth, or they feel it is a 
comfort to the members, (2) they feel it serves as a good public rela-
tions mechanism, or (3) the myth may serve as an effective means of 
manipulation and control of the members. 
The two previous views leatl to the conclusion that empirical evi-
dence has validated w. I.· Thomas' s dictum that "If men believe situa-
tions are real, they will be real in their consequences" (Thomas and 
Thomas, 1928:572). Members of organizations who accept the organiza-
tions' myths apparently come to feel the potency of the mythical trait. 
Finally, this study has tended to focus only on the sociological 
facet of the files, such that only in sociological terms can the files 
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be said to be mythical. Study of the substantive academic and other ef-
fects might yield valuable results. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The implication that the test files as a knowledge system may be 
largely a collective myth is highly provocative to the social scientist. 
It suggests that similar research might focus on other knowledge systems 
(albeit less bounded and convenient) to discover if their widely presumed 
potency might also prove illusionary. Among these are schools (of all 
sorts), labor unions, and mass media and information sources. 
The principal difficulty in the research of these knowledge systems 
is that a large scale knowledge system requires money, time and access 
not normally available to unfunded research. In addition, more respon-
sive measures than value-shifts should be utilized, including measure-
ment of changes in social structure or alterations in interaction pro-
cesses. New scales and methodologies must be devised specifically for 
measuring effects due to knowledge systems. Only through rigorously 
constructed research will the sociology of knowledge be widely accepted 
as an empirical aid to social understanding. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Part I 
Instructions: Please respond to each question in an honest and candid 
manner. All answers will be kept strictly confidential, and neither an 
individual nor an organization will be identifiable. ·Try to leave 
nothing blank. 
1. When you started to pledge your fraternity or sorority, was the 
presence of a test file and other sources given as a reason that you 
should join? 
yes 
---
rio 
---
don't remember 
---
2. How often do you use the test file? 
never once a semester_~- several times a semester 
---every few weeks 
---
3. How prevalent is the practice of simply approaching some fraternity 
or sorority brother (or sister) for information or old test results? 
never done 
---
rarely 
---
common 
---
very frequently 
---
4. Have you ever felt that there was anything wrong (or immoral) about 
using the test files, since most students do not have access to 
them? 
yes, often 
---
yes, occasionally no, or never considered 
---, it 
---
5. Do you feel that all instructors should be required to place old 
tests on file in the library so that anyone could see them by sim-
ply checking them out? 
yes __ _ no 
---
no opinion __ _ 
6. Do the test files help? 
yes __ _ no 
---
can't tell 
---
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7. Where do most of the tests and other material in the files come 
from? 
8. How reliable is the information in the files? 
excellent 
---
alright __ _ only fair 
---
poor __ _ 
no opinion __ _ 
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9. When a fraternity (or sorority) brother (or sister) asks if a non-
major or elective course is a good one, does he mean that it is an 
easy or an effective course? 
usually easy 
---
usually effective 
---
Part II 
Directions: The questionnaire is designed to measure the extent to 
which you hold each of several general attitudes or values connnon in our 
society. On the following pages you will find a series of general state-
ments expressing opinions of the kind you may have heard from other per-
sons around you. After each statement there is'a set of possible re-
sponses as follows: 
Strongly 
Disagree 
6 
Disagree 
5 
Slightly 
Disagree 
4 
Slightly 
Agree 
3 
Agree 
2 
Strongly 
Agree 
1 
You are asked to read each of the statements and then to circle the re-
sponse which best represents your innnediate reaction to the opinion ex-
pressed. -Respond to each opinion as a whole. If you have reservations 
about some part of a statement, circle the response whichmost-clearly 
approximates your _g_eneral_feeling. 
10. Obedience and respect for authority are 
the most important virtues children 
should learn. 
11. There is hardly anything lower than a 
person who does not feel a great love, 
gratitude, and respect for his parents. 
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12. What youth needs most is strick discipline, 
rugged determination, and the will to work 
and fight for family and country. 
13. You have to respect authority and when you 
stop respecting authority, your situation 
i sn I t worth much. 
14. Patriotism and loyalty are the first and the 
most important requirements of a good 
citizen. 
15. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, 
but as they grow up they ought to get over 
them and settle down. 
16. A child should not allowed to talk back to 
his parents, or else he will lose respect 
for them. 
17. The facts on crime and sexual immorality 
show that we will have to crack down harder 
on young people if we are going to save our 
moral standards. 
18. Disobeying an order is one thing you can't 
excuse--if one can get away with disobe-
dience; why can't everybody? 
19. A well-raised child is one who doesn't have 
to be told twice to do something. 
20. Since there are no values which can be 
eternal~ the only real values are those 
which meet the needs of the given moment. 
21. Nothing is static, nothing is everlasting, 
at any moment one must be re~dy to meet the 
change in environment by necessary change 
in one's moral views. 
22. Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for 
tomorrow we die. 
Q) 
Q) 
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>-. Q) 
,-I Q) 
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O Ill 
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6 5 4 3 2 1 
6 5 4 3 2 1 
6 5 4 3 2 1 
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23. The solution to almost any human problem 
should be based on the situation at the 
time, not on some general moral rule. 
24. Life is something to be enjoyed to the full, 
sensuously enjoyed with relish and enthus-
iasm. 
25. Life is more a festival than a work-place 
or a school for moral discipline. 
26. The past is no more, the future may never 
be, the present is all that we can be 
certain of. 
27. Not to attain happiness, but to be worthy 
of it, is the purpose of our existence. 
28. No time is better spent than that devoted 
to thinking about the ultimate purposes of 
life. 
29. Tenderness is more important than passion 
in love. 
30. Everyone should have an equal chance and an 
equal say. 
31. There should be equality for everyone--
because we are_ all human beings. 
32. A group of equals will work a lot better 
than a group with a rigid hierarchy. 
33. Each one should get what he needs--the 
things we have belong to all of us. 
34. No matter what the circumstances, one should 
never arbitrarily tell people what they have 
to do. 
35. It is the duty of every good citizen to 
correct anti-minority remarks made in his 
presence. 
Q) 
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36. Poverty could be almost entirely done away 
with if we made certain basic changes in 
our social and economic system. 
37. There has been too much talk and not enough 
real action in doing away with racial dis-
crimination. 
38. In any group it is more important to keep a 
friendly atmosphere than to be efficient. 
39. In a small group there should be no real 
leaders--everyone should have an equal say. 
40. To be superior a man must stand alone. 
41. In life an individual should for the most 
part "go it alone," assuring himself of 
privacy, having much time to himself, at-
tempting to control his own life. 
42. It is the man who stands alone who excites 
our admiration. 
43. The rich internal world of ideas, of sensi-
tive feelings, or reverie, of self know-
ledge, is man's true home. 
44. One must avoid dependence upon persons or 
things, the center of life should be found 
within oneself. 
45. The most rewarding object of study any man 
can find is his own inner life. 
46. Whoever would be a man, must be a non-
conformist. 
47. Contemplation is the highest form of human 
activity~ 
48. The individualist is the man who is most 
likely to discover the best road to a new 
future. 
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49. A man can learn better by striking out 
boldly 0n his own than he can by follow-
ing the advice of others. 
6 5 4 3 2 1 
Part III 
Instructions: Please read over the following statements, and for each 
one indicate (by a check in the appropriate space) whether it is some-
thing you can alwa_ys admire in other people, or something you always 
disl~ke_or something that depends~~ situation whether you admire it 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
Always 
Admire 
Depends on 
Situation 
Always 
Dislike 
Having a keen interest in internation-
al, national, and local affairs. 
Having a strong intellectual curiosity. 
Developing an appreciation of the fine 
arts--music, drama, literature, and 
ballet. 
Having an active interest in all 
things scholarly. 
Being well mannered and behaving 
properly in social situatiohs~ 
Dressing and acting in a way that is 
appropriate to the occasion. 
Being able to get people to cooperate 
with him. 
Being poised, gracious, and charming 
under all circumstances. 
Defending the honor of one's group 
whenever it is unfairly criticized. 
Working hard to improve the prestige 
and status of one's groups. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
7 5. 
76. 
Always 
Admire 
Depends on 
Situation 
Always 
Dislike 
Helping organize group activities. 
Studying hard to get good grades in 
school. 
Striving to ·get the top grade-
point average in the group. 
Working hard to achieve academic 
honors. -
Studying constantly in order to be-
come a well educated person. 
Being respected by people who are 
themselves worthwhile. 
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Gaining recognition for one's achieve-
ments. 
Being in a position to direct and mold 
others' lives. 
Always telling the truth, even though 
it may hurt oneself or others. 
Never telling a lie, even though to do 
so would make the situation more com-
fortable. 
Helping a close friend get by a tight 
situation, even though one may have to 
stretch the truth a bit to do it. 
Being devout in one's religious faith. 
Always living one's religion in his 
daily life. 
Always attending religious services 
regulaily and faithfully. 
Avoiding the physical pleasures that 
are prohibited in the Bible. 
Encouraging others to attend services 
and lead religious lives. 
Practicing self-control. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
81. 
82. 
Always 
Admire 
Depends on 
Situation 
Always 
Dislike 
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Replying to anger with gentleness. 
Never losing one's temper, no matter 
what the reason. 
Not expressing anger, even when one 
has a reason for doing so. 
Being outspoken and frank in expres-
sing one's likes and dislikes. 
Thinking and acting freely, without 
social restraints. 
Conforming to the requirements of any 
situation and doing what is expected 
of one. 
APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Instructions read to interviewee: The following series of questions are 
made up to study some aspects of life in a Greek organization, and are 
not to be used by anyone but the researcher. All information will be 
coded, and no one will be able to tell from what organization, or even 
which individual gave what information. Absolute privacy is assured. 
Please answer honestly, and do not feel that you answers can hurt or 
help your organization, for only untrue answers can hurt your organiza-
tion. 
What are the major reasons you would give for attending college? 
What do you like about fraternity (or sorority) life? 
How does your campus life differ from that of the independent? 
Which is stronger among fraternities or sororities members, loyalty to 
the university or the organization? How about you personally? 
How do you spend the average day in a school year? 
How much time do you spend studying in an average week (estimate the 
number of hours per day and per week)? 
Do you arrange your course schedules so as to allow for fraternity or 
sorority activities? Do you ever limit your course hours for the same 
reasons? 
Do you feel that as a non-fraternity or sorority member you would per-
form better gradewise? 
There appear to be some strange events involved in getting some tests. 
How are most tests obtained? How are the others obtained? 
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APPENDIX C 
December 15, 1971 
Dear 
This letter is being sent to you in an effort to solicit your co-
operation in conducting a research project among fraternities and so-
rorities on the Oklahoma State University campus. Supported by the De-
partment of Sociology, with the cooperation of Mrs. Karen Irey (Assistant 
Dean of Student Affairs), the project aims at the measurement of certain 
attitudes and values. All responses will be coded and strictly confi-
dential. 
As for you specifically, the expenditure of time will be very small. 
Contacts are generally being directed through the Vice-Presidents due to 
the often excessive work-load of the Presidents. 
If you have not already been contacted, then you will be soon, at 
which time details and arrangements may be made. Your serious consider-
ation and approval is crucial to the success of this study. 
Thank you for your time and assistance in this matter. 
129 
Sincerely, 
William F. Woodman 
Department of Sociology 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 
APPENDIX D 
COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO TRANSFORM DATA FROM ORIGINAL 
TO REFINED FORMATS 
DIMENSION IDATA(89), ISCORE (13) 
K=O 
1 READ (5, 5,END=lOO) IDATA 
5 FORMAT (311, 6X, 71Il/9X, 1511) 
I SCORE( l)=O 
DO 10 1=17,26 
10 ISCORE(l)=ISCORE(l)+IDATA(I) 
I SCORE( 2)=0. 
DO 15, 1=27,36 
15 ISCORE(2)=ISCORE(2)+IDATA(I) 
ISCORE(3)=0 
DO 20 1=37, 46 
20 ISCORE(3)=ISCORE(3)+IDATA(I) 
lSCORE( 4)=0 
DO 25 1=47, 56 
25 ISCORE(4)=ISCORE(4)+IDATA(I) 
1SCORE(5)=0. 
DO 30 I=57, 60 
30 1SCORE(5)=1SCORE(5)+1DATA(l) 
1SCORE(6)=0 
DO 35 1=61,64 
35 I SCORE( 6)=1SCORE( 6)+IDATA(l) 
1 SCORE ( 7)=0 
DO 40 1=65,67 
40 1SCORE(7)=ISCORE(7)+IDATA(I) 
1SCORE(8)=0 
DO 45 1=68, 71 
45 ISCORE(8)=ISCORE(8)+IDATA(I) 
ISCORE(9)=0 . 
DO 50 1=72, 74 
50 ISCORE(9)=ISCORE(9)+IDATA(I) 
I SCORE( 10)=0 
DO 55 1=75, 77 
55 ISCORE(lO)=ISCORE(lO)+IDATA(I) 
ISCORE(ll)=O 
DO 60 1=78, 82 
60 ISCORE(ll)=ISCORE(ll)+lDATA(l) 
1 SCORE ( 12)=0 
DO 65 1=83, 86 
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65 ISCORE(l2)=ISCORE(l2)+IDATA(I) 
ISCORE(l3)=0 
DO 70 1=87,89 
70 ISCORE(l3)=ISCORE(l3)+IDATA(I) 
K=K+l 
WRITE (7,90) (IDATA(I),I=l,16),ISCORE,K 
90 FORMAT (3Il,6X,13Il, 7X,13I2,23X,1I2) 
GO TO 1 
100 CALL EXIT 
END 
131 
APPENDIX E 
COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO CALCULATE "F" 
C PROGRAM AVARZ3 
c 
C DOUBLE OR TRIPLE-CLASSIFICATfON ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE• 
C PARAMETER CONTROL-CARD FIELDS. 
C COL 1-5 = NUMBER OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES TO BE ANALYZED IMAX= 701• 
C COL 6-10 = NUMBER OF LEVELS.FOR THE A FACTOR IMAX= 101• 
C COL 11,-15 • NUMBER OF LEVELS ·FOR THE A FACTOR IMAX : 1010 
C COL 16-ZO = NUMBER OF LEVELS FOR THE C FACTOR IMAX• 1010 
C SET= 1 FOR DOUBLE-CLASSIFICATION DESIGN. 
C COL 21-25 • NUMBER OF SUBJECTS PER ABC CELL, IF CELL N ARE ALL EOUALo 
C FOR UNEQUAL CfLL N SET= 9999 AND ADD A GROUP-CONTROL 
C CARD IN FRONT OF EACH CELL-SE'T OF DATA CARDS ICOL 1-!'1 ~ CELL Ni, 
C IF ZERO SCORES ARE TO BE TREATED AS MISSING DATA FOR ANY VARIABLE, 
C ADD MINUS SIGN TO THIS FIELD ANO ADD OPTION-SIGNAL CARD AFTER 
C FORMAT CONTROL CARD 11 = ZERO MEANS MISSING, 0 • ZERO VALIDo 
C COL 1 = VARIABLE l, ETC). 
C FORMAT MUST SPECIFY NV SCORE FIELDS IFOR ONE SUBJfCTlo 
C ORDER OF CELLS IN DATA DECK= AlRlCl, AlRlC2, AlB2Cl, ETCo 
C TAPE UNIT 2 IS USED FOR TEMPORARY STORAGE ISCRATCHlo 
C SUBPROGRAMS REOUIRfD ARE PRRF, CCOS, PRT~. 
c 
ODIMENSION KFl161t KHC151, ZMl701t 51101, 01101, FllOI, PllOI, 
1 A 110 It n C 10 I, CI 10 I, Af:11lO,10 I , AC 110, l O I, AC I l O, 10 I , 
2 ABCCl0,10,101• Wl701, Rl701, Tl701, Xl701, SXl701, 501701, GC701, 
3 GNCl0,10,101 
ND = 10 
5 CALL CCDS CKF, NV, NA, NBt NC, NSI 
NT= NA* NB* NC 
C ZERO ACCUMULATORS ANO READ MISSING-DATA OPTIONS, 
DO 10 I= 1,NV 
ZMIII = OoO 
Tiii = O.O 
Rill = O·oO 
10 Wiii = O.O 
IF INS .GTo 01 GO TO 20 
NS= IABSINSI 
READ 15, CZMIII, I= 1,NVI 
15 FORMAT 180Ft,O• 
20 REWIND 2 
C INPUT DATA, CHECK, ACCUMULATE SUMSo 
DO 50 M = I, NT 
N = NS 
IF IN oEOo 99991 READ 25, N 
25 FORMAT 1151 
DO 30 I = l,NV 
SX 111 = 0,0 
SOii I = OoO 
30 GI 11 = N 
DO 35 I = 1, N 
READ KF, IXIJI, J • 1,NVI 
DO 35 J = 1, NV 
IF (ZMIJI .Eo. 1.0 .AND. XIJI .r.o. 0.01 GIJI • GIJI - 1.0 
SX I JI = SX I JI + XI JI 
35 SOIJI = SOIJI + XIJ1**2 
00 45 I = l,NV 
IF I GI I I •GT• 0 • 0 I GO TO 40 
ZMI 11 = ;,.o 
GO TO 45 
C ACCUMULATE It/CELL NI ANO CELL VARIANCE. 
40 Will = Wiii + 150111 - SXll1**2 I Gilli 
Rill= Riii + loO /Gill 
C COMPUTE ANO TAPE CELL MEAN AND N FOR ALL VARIABLESo 
SX 111 = SX 111 I GI II 
45 Till = Tiii + Gill 
50 WRITE 121 SX, G 
C SET PARAMETERS ANO DEGREES OF FREEDOM, 
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TN= NT 
AN" NA 
BN NB 
CN NC 
Dl21 TN-leO 
Dl31 AN - leO 
DI 4 I AN - l e·O 
0151 CN - l•O 
Dt61 DIJl * 0141 
Dl71 DIJI * 0151 
0181 Dl41 * 0151 
Dl91 OIJI * Dl81 
C BEGIN ANALYSES OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES• 
DO 170 N = l,NV 
IF IZMINI eL Te 2eOI GO TO 60 
PRINT 55, N 
55 FORMAT I JlHllNSUFFICIENT DATA FOR VARIABLE, 131 
GO TO 170 
60 REWIND 2 
DO 65 I = 1,10 
SI II O.O 
All)= O.O 
Bill= OeO 
Cl 11 ·= o.o 
DO 65 J l ,10 
ABll,JI o.o 
AC I I, JI = 0 • 0 
65 AC( l,JI = O.O 
Dlll = TINI - leO 
DI 101 = TINI - TN 
C COMPUTE 1~scORE-PER-CELL ANALYSIS ANO CELL MEANS, 
DO 70 I = 1,NA 
DO 70 J = 1, NB 
DO 70 K = 1,NC 
READ 12l SX, G 
GN r I • J. KI = Gr N I 
5121 5121 + SXfNl**2 
Alll Alll + $XINl 
BIJI AIJI + SXINl 
CIKl Cl'KI + SXINl 
ABll,Jl = ABll,Jl + SXINI 
AC II, Kl = AC II, KI + S XI N l 
BCIJ,KI = BCIJ,KI + SXI.NI 
70 ABCll,J,KI = SXINl 
DO 80 I = 1, NA 
SIJl = SIJl + Alll**2 I IBN * CNI 
Alll =Alll / lBN*CNI 
DO 75 J = 1, NB 
Sl6l = S16l + ABll,J.l**2 I CN 
75 AAlf ,.Jl = ABII, Jl I CN 
DO 80 K = 1,NC 
Sl7l = Sl71 + ACll,Kl**2 I BN 
80 AC I I , Kl = AC I I , KI I BN 
DO 85 J = l,NB 
SC41 = 5141 + BIJl**2 I IAN* CNI 
BIJI = BIJI I IAN* CNI 
DO 85 K = 1,NC 
5181 = Sl81 + BCIJ,Kl**2 I AN 
85 BCIJ,KI = BCIJ,KI I AN 
CF,. O.O 
00 90 K = l ,NC 
CF= CF+ CIKI 
5151 = 5151 + CIKl**2 I IAN* BNI 
90 CIKI = CIKI I CAN* BNI 
CF• CF* CF I TN 
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C ADJUST SUMS OF SQUARES ANO COMPLETE COMPUTATION• 
DO 95 I = 2,9 
95 Siii 15111 - CFI * TN I RINI 
5161 5161 - 5131 - 5141 
5171 = 5171 - 5131 - 5151 
5181 = 5181 - 5141 - 5151 
5191 = 5171 - 5131 - 5141 - 5151 - 5161 - 5171 - 5181 
SflOI = WINI 
Sill = 5121 + 51101 
C CONVERT SUMS OF SQUARES TO MEAN SOUARESo 
00 100 I= 1,10 
IF !Diii .GT. OoOI Siii e Sill I Diii 
100 CONTINUE 
C COMPUTE F-RATIOS AND PROBABIL1TIESo 
DO 105 I= 3,9 
Fill = Siii I 51101 
105 P(II • PRRFIOIII, 01101, FIIII 
C PRINT SOURCE TABLE ANO RELEVANT CELL MEANS• 
OPRINT l!Ot No ISi II• Dlllt I• lo31t Fl31t Pl31, Sl41t Dl41t F14io 
l P~41 
lIOOFORMAT l///21H ANALYSIS OF VARIARLE, 13 // 7H SOURCE, 16X, 4HMoSot 
1 7X, 4HO.Fo, 4Xo 7HF-RATIO, BX, lHP // 6H TOTAL, F2lo3t ~lOoO II 
2 BH BETWEEN, Fl9o~t FlO~O I 3X, IHA, F23o3t FlOoOt 2Fl2o4 I 
3 3X, lHR, F23o3, FlOoO, 2Fl2o41 
IF INC oGTo 11 PRINT 115, Sl51t Dl51, Fl51, Pl51 
115 FORMAT 13X, lHC, F23o3t FIO.O, 2Fl2o41 
PRINT 120, 5161, 0161, Fl61, P161 
120 FORMAi 13Xt 2HAB, F22o3t FlOoOt 2Fl2o41 
IF INC oGTo 11 PRINT 125, ISl!lt 011,, ~Ill, Pill, I • 7,91 
1250FORMAT 13X, 2HAC, F22o3t FlOoOt 2Fl2o4 I 3X, 2HBC, F22o3t 
l FlOoO, 2Fl2o4 I 3X, 3HABC, F2lo3t FlOoOt 2Fi2o41 
PRINT 130t 51101, 01101 
130 ~~~~A;R~~ J~,W.~!~I~: =~~·~;l~!oNg,111 23H MEANS FOR ALL EFFECTSol 
CALL PRTS 19, NB, l, 6HB MAIN, NOi 
IF INC oGTo 11 CALL PRTS IC, NC, lt 6HC MAINt NOi 
CALL PRTS !AA, NA, NB, 6HA BY Bt NOi 
IF !Nt oEOo 11 GO TO 150 
CALL PRTS IAC, NA, NC, 6HA BY Ct NDI 
CALL PRTS IBC, NB, NC, 6HA BY Ct NOi 
PRINT 135 
135 FORMAT 1// 31H CELL MEANSo BLOCKS• C LEVELS•I 
DO 145 Ke loNC 
00 140 Is 1,NA 
00 140 J s 1,NB 
140 ABll,JI = AB(ll,J,KI 
145 CALL PRTS (AB, NA, NB, 2HABt NOi 
150 IF IZMINI oEOo OoOI GO TO 170 
C PRINT CELL N MATRIX• 
PRINT 155 · 
155 FORMAT 1// 38H SUBJECTS PER CELLo BLOCKS• C LEVELSol 
DO 165 K • ltNC 
DO 160 I• ltNA 
00 160 J • ltNB 
160 ABll,JI • GNll,J,KI 
165 CALL PRTS IAB, NAt NB• 2HAB, NOi 
170 CONTINUE 
GO TO 5 
ENO 
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